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ABSTRACT 
 
 This mixed-methods research study examined the level of collective action that is 
occurring among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in maternal and child 
health in Haiti. This study takes the view that health, and by extension, maternal and 
child health, is a global public good; global public goods are most efficiently provided by 
the means of collective action. Therefore, to the extent that maternal and child health 
services are provided efficiently in Haiti, collective action should be occurring.  
 This study utilized a semi-structured interview approach to gather both qualitative 
and quantitative data. A total of 17 participants who were managers or executives of 
NGOs working in maternal and child health in Haiti were interviewed. The interviews 
also gathered quantitative data that characterized types of cooperation that were occurring 
among NGOs. The qualitative data that were collected in these interviews were analyzed 
using thematic analysis, and quantitative data were analyzed using social network 
analysis. The findings concluded that while there is cooperation occurring among NGOs 
in Haiti, the cooperation levels are low, networks are not very dense and there is overall 
general consensus that more cooperation is needed 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter reviews the literature that supports the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation study. This study views health as a global public good, which are most 
effectively and efficiently provided through the provision of collective action--groups or 
individuals working together in order to achieve a common goal(s). Collective action, 
however, as theorized by Olson (1971), is not achieved voluntarily. Individuals or groups 
must be forced or coerced to cooperate, due to rational and self-interested behavior. 
 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are vehicles through which the 
provision of public goods, such as health, are often delivered, particularly in developing 
countries, which often lack sound infrastructural and social services that would help to 
ensure effective provision of such services. Much of foreign aid today, including aid that 
supports the provision of health services, is channeled through NGOs. However, aid, 
while essentially well-intentioned, has been the subject of criticism for decades. Aid 
failures abound, and while there have been measured successes, there is substantial room 
for improvement.  
 NGOs are not always held to legal requirements in developing countries, and 
often they operate without any type of official oversight or governing body affiliation. 
Therefore, their accountability to the larger aid community is limited. Collective action 
theory says that their voluntary cooperation will also therefore be limited. This literature 
review explores these concepts in detail, and argues for the urgency of collective action 
among stakeholder organizations to improve health outcomes.  
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Global Public Goods 
 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work in health provide a global 
public good. Economic inputs to human well-being are classified as either public goods 
or private goods (Cornes & Sandler, 1996; Kaul & Faust, 2001). Whether a good is 
public or private depends on its consumption properties. A private good is “excludable” 
and includes items such as food and clothing (Kaul & Faust, 2001). Clear property rights 
are assigned to private goods and it is the owner’s choice as to how, when, and by whom 
that private good is enjoyed (Kaul, 2009). A private good’s consumption means that 
another person cannot enjoy that same item; the enjoyment and consumption of an 
excludable good means, as the description implies, that others are excluded from 
enjoying it (Kaul & Faust, 2001).  Public goods, on the other hand, are “non-excludable” 
goods and their enjoyment does not mean others are excluded from being able to enjoy 
that same item (Kaul & Faust, 2001). Examples of public goods are air and national 
defense. Public goods are in the public domain and are available for all to consume. 
Peoples’ preferences for certain public goods may vary, based on a wide variety of 
factors (political, socioeconomic, geographic, cultural) but all have access to the same 
public goods at the same provision level, whether or not someone else is enjoying the 
same good (Kaul, 2009).  
 The main problem involved in the provision of public goods is what is termed the 
“free rider” issue. The free rider problem, taken from the analogy of a firm operating in a 
market, holds that in a competitive market, firms might cooperate to maintain high prices 
on their goods. In this case, cooperation is collectively rational. However, for the small 
	 3 
firm that believes it can increase output without affecting overall price levels, non-
cooperation is optimal. This is because that small firm can capture a larger portion of the 
market and keep higher profits for itself (Gillinson, 2004).  The firm maintains a lower 
price than the others, while reaping a more substantial benefit than would occur if the 
small firm cooperated with the price collusion. Thus, the small firm “free rides” off of the 
cooperation of others. The challenge with public goods and the free rider problem is that 
there is generally a weaker incentive for private provision because their benefits are non-
excludable and their consumption cannot generally be made exclusive (Gartner, 2012). 
Thus, it is optimal for individuals to “free ride” off of the production of public goods. 
This also means that public goods are under-produced because the consumer who has 
access to the good has little reason to pay his or her appropriate share. Unless that 
consumer is a highly moral person, he or she is likely to be a free rider (Kindleberger, 
1986). 
 In the case of public goods, providers may not adequately be compensated by the 
market and therefore there is no incentive to produce them. To avoid this, governments 
often implement policies to ensure cooperation and equitable burden-sharing, such as 
taxes to finance parks and roads (Kaul & Faust, 2001).  
 Health is not easily categorized as either a public good or a private good, but the 
classification of health as a private good is difficult. As previously mentioned, private 
goods are those that are excludable to others, and those to which the owner of the good 
can assign a clear value and property rights (Kaul, 2009). While it is certainly not outside 
the realm of possibility that health care can be a private good and assigned a price and 
withheld from those who cannot afford to pay for it, this is highly unethical. In addition, 
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private goods usually possess benefits that rival those of another commodity (Karsten, 
1995). This is not the case with health care; it is not like choosing to buy either a car or a 
motorcycle. On the other hand, health care is not easily classified as a public good. Public 
goods are those that do not possess the exclusion principle; that is, they are available for 
anyone to enjoy and consume regardless of one’s ability to pay. This is not the case with 
health care; in many instances, people must pay at least some amount in order to receive 
care. In addition, health care does not have infinite resources at its disposal. As with the 
examples of national defense and air, everyone can enjoy those public goods regardless 
of where a person lives. In health care, location, especially in resource-limited settings, 
dictates the amount and frequency of health care that can be consumed.  
 Many public goods have assumed a global dimension and a global effect (Kaul, 
2009; Nordhaus, 2010). These types of goods are known as global public goods, which 
are goods that have a global impact, and that impact is spread indivisibly around the 
globe (Nordhaus, 2010). Public goods become global when the benefits of those goods 
flow to more than one country, and no country can effectively be denied access to those 
benefits (World Health Organization, 2014). The costs and benefits of global public 
goods transcend national borders and have impacts on countries in several regions (Kaul, 
2009). The World Bank (2011) identifies five areas that encompass global public goods: 
the environmental commons, communicable disease, international trade, international 
financial architecture, and global knowledge for development. Global public goods are 
increasingly becoming a significant issue due to the rapid globalization that has occurred 
in recent years. This rapid pace does not show any signs of slowing in the near future. No 
longer can countries limit themselves to providing certain public goods on a national 
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basis. In fact, many public goods have gone from being national public goods to global 
public goods.  
 While the provision of national public goods presents challenges, global public 
goods are arguably the most difficult public goods to provide in adequate, reasonably 
distributed quantities (Edwards & Zadek, 2002). Their global scale is intimidating, and 
the number of actors that are needed to work together and cooperate poses serious 
challenges. Global public goods differ from other economic issues in that there is no 
workable mechanism for resolving their issues both efficiently and effectively. There is 
currently no market or government mechanism that contains both the political means and 
the appropriate incentive to implement an effective outcome (Nordhaus, 2010; Gartner, 
2012). Markets can solve many problems, but they cannot solve the problems inherent in 
the effective and efficient provision of global public goods. Global public goods are 
susceptible to the general challenges that public goods pose, except the challenges are 
magnified, due to the global scale.  
 Global public goods raise many problematic issues, primarily due to what has 
been termed the Westphalian dilemma. When a social, economic, or political problem 
arises, one of the very first questions to be addressed concerns the organizational level at 
which the issue should be resolved. Should it be addressed at the individual, household, 
local, state, or federal level? The Treaty of Westphalia, passed in 1648, recognized the 
system of sovereign states, which gave each state the political sovereignty to govern its 
own territory. Over time, the system of sovereign states developed and the current system 
of international law evolved which now dictates that international obligations may only 
be imposed upon a sovereign state with its consent (Nordhaus, 2010). When issues of 
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global public goods arise, no state can be forced to provide them in any quantity. Since 
there is no international rule of law that sovereign states are required to follow, all 
provision of global public goods is completely voluntary, and heavily depends on the 
cooperation of states. Those states that do not cooperate free ride off the cooperation of 
others. Sovereign nations cannot be forced into any action, and have no overriding 
authority to whom they answer. Their actions, or inactions, cannot be dictated by any 
governing body, including the United Nations. With no governing body to police global 
public goods, any action on global public goods provision is completely voluntary and up 
to the discretion of an individual nation. 
 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
“Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances” (United Nations, 1948). 
 
This declaration clearly delineates that health is a basic human right to which everyone 
around the world is entitled, regardless of circumstance. The Brighton Declaration 
declared in 2004 that health is a global public good and that health is a key component of 
collective human security (United Kingdom Public Health Association, 2004). Generally, 
global public goods as they apply to health tout the prevention and containment of 
infectious and communicable disease as the “classic case” of global public goods 
(Gartner, 2012). Communicable diseases themselves are global public “bads” and their 
containment is a global public “good” (Kaul & Faust, 2001). Some do consider “health” 
itself to be a private good, as previously discussed. However, even though communicable 
disease is inherently a threat to the global collective good and well-being, health itself 
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can also be considered a global public good. Some consider the prevention of SARS and 
avian influenza, diseases that can rapidly spread around the world in a matter of hours, to 
be the only true global public “bads” as they relate to communicable disease. However, 
other communicable diseases, such as malaria and HIV/AIDS, while not able to spread as 
rapidly or as widely as SARS or influenza in such a short timeframe, are also just as 
destructive and pose as much, if not more, of a threat to the global collective good. 
Allowing these disease burdens to persist poses a threat to economic globalization, 
international peace and security, and the prosperity and well-being of industrialized 
countries (Kaul & Faust, 2001). HIV/AIDS can have a destabilizing effect in heavily-
burdened countries, which can eventually give rise to a global economic impact (Smith & 
MacKellar, 2007). In addition, given that the countries with the highest disease burden 
are developing countries and therefore in need of high levels of foreign aid to combat 
these issues, this creates an economic drain that pulls resources from higher income 
countries where that money could otherwise be spent elsewhere. Finally, unhealthy 
people are generally less productive than their healthier counterparts. It has been 
proposed by several theorists that “people are prosperous not as individuals but as 
members of a prosperous society” (Karstens, 1995, p. 131). For a society to prosper, its 
individuals must be healthy so that they are productive and can contribute to economic 
output. 
 
Collective Action Theory  
 Global public goods are best provided when people and entities work together to 
produce and provide optimal levels (Kaul & Faust, 2001; Smith & MacKellar, 2007; 
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Kaul, 2009; Buchan et al., 2011; Gartner, 2012). This, however, takes a concerted effort 
on the part of many, and ensuring effective cooperation is an extremely difficult task. 
Cooperation on this level, where individuals or groups come together to achieve a 
common goal, is known as collective action. However, collective action theory, first 
recognized by Mancur Olson (1971) in his seminal work, argues that any group of people 
who is trying to provide a public good will have trouble doing so efficiently. Olson 
(1971) argues that it is often taken for granted that groups with common interests will 
collectively organize to achieve those common interests. This erroneous belief is based 
on the premise of rational and self-interested behavior. In other words, it has widely been 
considered to follow logically that if rational and self-interested individuals would all be 
better off if their common goals and objectives were achieved, then they will work 
together to achieve them. Olson (1971), however, debunks this myth and asserts that in 
fact, this is not the case, stating “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite 
small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in 
their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests.” (p. 2).  Stated differently, individuals will not voluntarily 
cooperate and work together to achieve their common goals unless they are either forced 
or coerced to do so. 
 Olson (1971) gives the example of a nation state, which has never been able to 
achieve its goals through any type of voluntary taxation. Patriotism and pride in one’s 
country is a powerful emotion, and even though the nation-state has the ability to evoke 
these emotions in people, it still has never been able to collect taxes through voluntary 
means. Taxation is a forced mechanism in which citizens are required by law to 
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participate. Therefore, Olson (1971) argues, if a state, with all of the emotional resources 
at its disposal, cannot motivate voluntary tax payments, organizations may very well have 
the same problem motivating employees or groups of individuals to collectively organize 
voluntarily to advance common interests. 
 Unfortunately, as with any firm in a market, these groups fall prey to the free-
rider problem. While all members of a group may share an interest in achieving a 
collective benefit, they do not necessarily share an interest in paying the entire cost of 
providing that collective good. Each member would prefer that others pay the entire cost 
while still being able to receive the benefit even if that particular member did not pay any 
of the cost (Olson, 1971). Organizations, or individuals within an organization, may not 
be motivated to put in the necessary effort to provide a public good if shirking these 
efforts will not be noticed and the public good can still reasonably be provided, even if 
the provision is not as efficient or as effective as it would be had all organizations or 
individuals cooperated.  
 In addition to the free rider problem, organizations also face the issue of size. The 
larger the organization or group, the more difficult it will be for that organization or 
group to provide the optimal amount of a collective good. There are three reasons this 
happens. First, as a group gets larger, the fraction of total group benefit any person acting 
in the group receives becomes smaller. This also means that the reward for group-
oriented action is less than adequate. Second, as the group becomes larger and the share 
of the total benefit going to any individual becomes smaller, it becomes less and less 
likely that any single individual will gain enough from the provision of the collective 
good to entice him or her to bear the cost and burden of providing it, even in small 
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amounts. Third, the larger the group, the greater the costs to the organization, and 
therefore it becomes increasingly difficult to provide the collective good in any amount. 
In a small group, there may not be a need for any type of formal cooperation and all 
members may get along and agree. In a larger group, however, no collective good can be 
obtained and provided without some sort of agreement or coordination (Olson, 1971). 
The larger a group becomes, the more agreement and organization is needed. In a very 
large group, also called a “latent” group, if one member does or does not assist in 
providing the collective good, no other individual member will significantly be affected 
and therefore no one has any reason to act (Olson, 1971). As this latent group grows even 
larger, this issue is magnified.  
 How are these problems to be resolved? Olson (1971) states that only a separate 
and selective incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a 
group-oriented way. Selective incentives can be negative by coercing and punishing those 
who do not act in the group interest, or they can be positive by rewarding those who act 
in the interest of the group. Partnerships to achieve a common goal can be beneficial, but 
they can be extremely difficult to work with and become more unsuccessful as the 
number of partners increases. Cooperation and coordination may be in the best interest of 
the group, but the degree to which this cooperation and coordination actually occurs will 
generally determine the outcome of public goods provision. 
 Many of today’s global issues are social dilemmas (Buchan et al., 2011). Social 
dilemmas, including public goods dilemmas, exist whenever the cumulative result of 
reasonable, individual choice is a collective disaster (Brewer & Kramer, 1986). 
Individuals must choose whether to participate in behaviors that have primarily a self-
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serving interest or to participate in behaviors that benefit the collective good. For 
example, many people may prefer not to contribute their hard-earned money to public 
health and medical research, but if everyone chooses not to contribute, the population 
does not benefit in the long run. In a public goods decision, an individual must decide 
whether to give up an immediate benefit for him or herself in order to benefit a collective 
group (Brewer & Kramer, 1986). The public goods dilemma applies to a situation that is 
directly costly to the individual and beneficial for all members of a group (Frank, 2010). 
It is in these public goods dilemmas where the temptation to free ride is high. If only a 
few individuals free ride, it is not likely to have a large effect on the provision of the 
public good. However, if many choose to free ride, the provision of the public good is 
limited and far less than optimal. Two variables have been found to influence the 
outcomes of social dilemma situations: group size and the social group identity of the 
individual decision makers (Brewer & Kramer, 1986). As group size increases, public 
goods decisions that favor the collective good decrease. This effect, however, can 
potentially be overridden when collective group identity is high (Brewer & Kramer, 
1986). The degree to which individuals see themselves as part of a group determines the 
outcome of public goods decisions, and will determine if they cooperate. Levels of 
cooperation are higher when individuals possess a shared in-group identity or when group 
members strongly identify with the collective than when individuals do not possess a 
shared identity (Buchan et al., 2011; Wit & Kerr, 2002; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; 
Brewer & Kramer, 1986). Two mechanisms that have emerged to explain this 
cooperation as a result of strong social identification are expectancies and values. 
Expectancies refer to the belief that people within a group have that others will cooperate 
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because they are all a part of that same group (Foddy, Platow & Yamagishi, 2009). The 
expectation that other people will cooperate dispels some of the fear that one’s own 
cooperation will be in vain (Buchan et al., 2011). It is important to point out, however, 
that the expectation that other people have the full intention of cooperating is not 
sufficient to generate and guarantee cooperation. This is magnified in large, dispersed 
groups (De Cremer, Dewitte & Snyder, 2001). Although trust reduces fear, it does not 
eliminate greed. If everyone else is expected to cooperate, noncooperation takes 
advantage of other people’s contributions; in very large groups where monitoring may be 
minimal, the temptation to take advantage of other peoples’ cooperation and free ride is 
large (Buchan et al., 2011). Values can increase cooperation, as well. Strengthening 
group identity increases the value that people attach to the group’s well-being, as opposed 
to only their personal well-being (Buchan et al., 2011). Individuals that attach themselves 
to a larger group identity see themselves interchangeably—their sense of self dissipates 
as their sense of “group” increases (Buchan et al., 2011; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & 
Wetherell, 1987). Pursuing the group interest therefore takes precedence over pursuing 
self-interest.  
 Public goods games experiments have been the subject of multiple studies. In a 
typical public goods game experiment, the person leading the experiment will give each 
individual in a group the same amount of money. Players may then decide whether to 
keep the money or invest it into a common pool. Whatever monetary amount is placed in 
the common pool is then doubled and divided equally among the players, irrespective of 
each individual player’s contribution amount. If all the players cooperate and contribute 
the maximum amount to the individual pool, each player will end up with a maximum 
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amount once the common pool is divided. However, players are tempted to free ride on 
others’ contributions. Rational individual behavior predicts that no player will contribute 
to the common pool, even though it is to everyone’s advantage for all players to 
cooperate and contribute their entire individual amount to the collective. Experiments 
show that actual contribution levels fall somewhere between 20% to 70% of each 
player’s individual total (Cressman, Song, Zhang & Tao, 2011). In many public goods 
experiments, players will tend to cooperate initially, but this initial cooperation declines 
quickly over time (Branas-Garza & Espinosa, 2011; Xu, Wang & Zhang, 2010). These 
experiments usually confirm that public goods dilemmas generally fail to produce the 
collective benefit that is desired (Milinski, Semmann & Krambeck, 2002).  
 Buchan et al. (2011) studied the influence of social identity on group behavior. 
The experiment was a multi-level public goods dilemma that was conducted in six 
countries. Selected countries (United States, Italy, Argentina, South Africa, Russia, Iran) 
were those that represented high variability in environmental factors. The purpose was to 
see whether participants chose to make contributions that benefitted themselves, a local 
group, or a worldwide group. Men and women aged 18-75 who represented varying 
levels of socioeconomic status were sampled (n=1195) and asked to make contribution 
decisions at the local, national or global level. Results indicated that global social identity 
is a factor in an individual’s decision to contribute to collective goods even if there is no 
expectation of a return on that individual’s investment. Across all countries, self-reported 
identification with a global community was a predictor of the size of contributions to a 
global collective (Buchan et al., 2011). Overall, the study showed that a strong social 
identity and sense of belonging to a larger collective will positively influence an 
	 14 
individual’s cooperative behavior. The study suggested that in the absence of monitoring 
and punishment of non-cooperative behavior, strong social identity and in-group 
belonging is essential to facilitating cooperation. 
 De Cremer and Van Dijk (2002) tested the effects of identification level, social 
value orientation, and feedback on contributions in a public goods dilemma. The study 
sought to determine whether those who identify more strongly with a group would 
contribute more to the collective based on their social value orientation and the feedback 
they received regarding the success or failure of other group members to contribute 
sufficiently to the collective pool. Social value orientation was measured and participants 
were classified as either prosocial (those interested in maximizing joint outcomes and 
concerned with the equality of outcomes), individualistic (those interested in maximizing 
their own personal outcomes regardless of the outcomes of others), or competitive (those 
interested in maximizing the difference between their own outcomes and the outcomes of 
others). Participants (n=142) in an introductory social psychology course took part in the 
multi-round experiment. Type of identity was manipulated in the first round by telling 
participants that researchers were interested in either the individual outcome or the group 
outcome of the contributions. Feedback was manipulated by telling half of the 
participants that the group failed to sufficiently contribute to the common pool and by 
telling the other half that the group had successfully managed to contribute sufficiently to 
the common pool. Results showed that those participants who were told that their group 
failed to sufficiently contribute to the common pool motivated those who held a strong 
social identity to contribute more to the collective in the second round. This is consistent 
with the goal-transformation hypothesis, which states that a strong group identity can 
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transform peoples’ motives from the individual to the group level (De Cremer & Van 
Dijk, 2002). Participants with a weak group identity contributed less to the common pool 
in the second round, as could reasonably be expected since they most likely had low 
expectations about their fellow group members’ behavior. Both this study and Buchan et 
al.’s (2011) study demonstrate that a strong group identity is recommended in order to 
facilitate optimal cooperation levels. 
 
Provision of Public Goods 
 Given the issues that providing public goods poses, one is left to wonder the best 
way in which to deliver them optimally and efficiently. Historically, public goods have 
been provided either publicly or privately. Before the 19th century, public goods were 
actually privately financed and provided. It was not until the 19th century that the idea of 
what is now the modern “welfare state” emerged. Around this time, the idea that public 
goods should be publicly provided began to replace the privatization ideal (Li, 1996). The 
state provided public goods for years, and today that ideal still does prevail—the public 
sector should be responsible for providing public goods. However, in recent years, there 
has been a shift in the division of responsibility between the public and private sectors for 
the delivery of public goods (Ghatak, 2005). In most developed countries, there is a mix 
of both public and private provision of public goods. Today, the state does continue to 
provide many public goods, such as infrastructure (including gas, sewage, and roads). 
Some of these public goods are also provided privately, but they require regulation.  
Other public goods, such as defense, are often publicly provided but private contractors 
deliver certain aspects of the good. While the government does provide a large portion of 
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national defense, it also contracts with private providers to assist with the provision of 
services. However, despite the provision benefits that both sectors have, neither private 
nor public provision of public goods is optimal nor efficient. Public provision is not as 
effective as private provision, as public provision tends to produce less efficient 
outcomes because often the public good is severely under-provided (Slavov, 2014). This 
is often because public goods provision is dependent on either voluntary contributions or 
taxation. Voluntary contributions will always be lower than what is needed, as an 
individual bears the full marginal cost of providing the public good, but receives only a 
small portion of its nonrival benefits (Slavov, 2014). If a public good is provided through 
taxation, it can be efficiently provided, but only if a nation’s tax structure is solid and the 
citizens can afford the tax—in developing countries, public goods provision by taxation 
is, therefore, not an effective solution. Private provision, on the other hand, does a better 
job of optimally providing a public good, but from a welfare standpoint, produces a sub-
optimal outcome (Warr, 1983). This is because “efficiency” does not take into account 
other aspects of effectiveness, including issues such as equity, inclusion and social 
justice. There may be policy measures in place to redress this situation, but these 
measures may not be implemented (Warr, 1983). In addition, economic theory dictates 
that the market does not efficiently allocate goods that involve externalities (Ghatak, 
2005). Ultimately, private provision of public goods can be effective, but only inasmuch 
that a nation’s infrastructure is strong and sound. A market can only be as effective as the 
environment in which it exists. 
 While developed countries may still struggle with optimal provision of public 
goods through public or private means, they generally can produce sufficient outcomes. 
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In developing countries, however, a strong public sector usually does not exist and 
therefore cannot provide public goods in any sort of sufficient measure. Private 
organizations have sometimes been tasked with trying to remedy this situation in the 
absence of a strong state, but, this, too, has generally failed, as there is no profit incentive 
for the private sector.  In many developing countries, a phenomenon has emerged to 
provide public goods. This phenomenon is known as the “third sector,” and consists of 
NGOs. NGOs now provide many public goods, such as health, to developing countries. 
The state cannot effectively provide public goods to its population due to its weak 
governance and lack of resources, and the private sector cannot effectively provide public 
goods due to the private sector’s responsibility and fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 
NGOs are left to fill in the gap, and in some cases, have completely circumvented the 
state in regards to public goods provision.  NGOs, like the private sector, are considered 
to be “value-driven”; however, whereas the private sector derives value from profits, 
NGOs derive value from benefitting and providing goods and services to their target 
populations—usually, the poor (Ghatak, 2005). The vast majority of developing countries 
have therefore, either by choice or by outside pressures, turned to NGOs to provide many 
public goods. In most developing countries, NGOs provide the bulk of public goods to 
the population. 
 Each sector (private, public, and NGOs) has valuable attributes to contribute to 
the provision of public goods. The private and public sectors have proven their 
inefficiency in providing public goods, specifically health, especially in developing 
country contexts. This has placed the disproportionate burden on NGOs to provide public 
goods. While there have been successes, there still remains, in many cases, a largely 
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ineffective provision of public goods by NGOs. While they are essential players in 
providing public goods, they are not necessarily efficient.  
 
A Brief History of International Aid and the Rise of NGOs 
 NGOs usually are considered part of the “aid agenda,” where richer countries 
send money and human resources to poorer countries for the purpose of improving social 
and economic conditions for the population. They are also known as the “third sector”, or 
that sector that is neither public (state-run) nor private. In many instances, especially in 
developing countries, NGOs provide the bulk of social services to the population that 
normally would fall under the responsibility of state provision, but they are not 
accountable to either the state or to the population which they serve. 
 NGOs, and for that matter, international aid as it currently is defined, are 
relatively new phenomena. The term NGO was first used in the United Nations charter in 
1946, which means that they already had to have existed at that time (Ahmed & Potter, 
2006). NGOs actually were present as early as the 19th century. For example, the earliest 
NGOs in Germany that are still active today were founded in the 1830s, though at the 
time of their founding, the term NGO would not have been used to describe them 
(Ahmed & Potter, 2006). However, while NGOs in their current form are relatively new, 
the idea of helping the poor is decidedly not a new phenomenon. Many NGOs are 
involved in what could be termed “care and welfare” activities (Bagci, 2003), which 
historically were tenants of the church in earlier times. Historically, the church carried 
out the functions of care for the poor. Eventually, the idea of having organizations 
devoted solely to this activity made its way into mainstream society. These early 
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organizations were generally developed and founded by the church itself. The oldest 
development NGO was founded in 1743 in Switzerland, and while most of the earliest 
mission activities overseas were focused on proselytizing and converting the populations 
in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, eventually many organizations began 
to develop schools and hospitals (Chabbott, 1999). Early missions raised funds directly 
from churches and individuals and kept contact with donors (Chabbott, 1999). These 
donors received regular updates about conditions in the “developing” world, which raised 
their consciousness level and cultivated a compassion for the poor people throughout the 
world who were victims of circumstance. This attitude still continues today. 
 Prior to World War I, there were not many NGOs on the world stage, especially 
in comparison to today’s numbers. Boli and Thomas (1999) found that NGOs only began 
to grow rapidly beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, with about ten 
organizations per year being founded beginning in the 1890’s, with a peak of 51 
foundings in 1910. After 1910, the number of NGOs being founded dwindled and 
remained that way until after World War II, when the founding NGOs, specifically 
international NGOs, exploded. By 1947, over 90 NGOs per year were being founded, and 
that pace continued through the 1960s (Boli & Thomas, 1999). Post WWII, during the 
period of 1946-1985, more than 80% of all development international NGOs  that 
currently exist today were founded (Chabbott, 1999). 
 The reasons for the explosion in NGOs after WWII are several fold. First, the 
destruction and devastation that wreaked throughout the world created an urgent situation 
that governments were not capable of addressing by themselves. The famine and disease 
that followed WWII prompted the creation of many new NGOs, including Oxfam, 
	 20 
Catholic Relief Services, World Relief, and CARE, which continue to operate today and 
are some of the biggest international NGOs (Chabbott, 1999). Second, the Cold War was 
on the horizon and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which 
was founded in order to assist with reconstruction after WWII, channeled the majority of 
the aid it received from the Western powers to Eastern Europe. The Western alliance 
became concerned that the aid it was sending was being used to prop up puppet 
Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and recommended that going forward, 
the majority of aid being dispersed throughout the world be channeled through bilateral 
(government-to-government) transfers or through US-based NGOs, rather than through 
multi-lateral (a group of countries or an institution representing a group of countries) 
transfers, in order to better control the aid’s destination (Chabbott, 1999). The final 
reason for the incredible growth in the number of NGOs appearing on the world stage 
after 1945 is that the developed world began to see international development as an 
essential global undertaking, which created a demand for organizations such as NGOs to 
be able to operationalize that concept (Chabbott, 1999). 
 Post-WWII also saw the creation of “aid” as we now have come to know it today. 
Two major occurrences took place in the post-war era that played pivotal roles in shaping 
the current development aid sector. The first occurrence was the convening of the Bretton 
Woods Conference, which was held in New Hampshire for the purposes of restructuring 
international finance, establishing a multilateral trading system and constructing a 
framework for economic cooperation that would mitigate the circumstances that led to 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. Recognizing that Europe would never rebuild unless 
huge injections of aid were poured into it, this conference established the International 
	 21 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(now known as the World Bank). In sum, the World Bank was tasked with the 
responsibility of facilitating capital investment for reconstruction and the IMF was tasked 
with managing the global financial system (Moyo, 2009). Eventually, during a later 
period, both institutions would come to play a large and powerful role in our current 
understanding of development aid, but in their original forms, both the IMF and the 
World Bank managed reconstruction, and not development. The second occurrence took 
place in 1947 and culminated in the Marshall Plan, a radical proposal that called for a 
rescue package for Europe to the tune of US$20 billion. By the time the period of the 
Marshall Plan had ended (1948-1952), the United States had transferred assistance to 
fourteen European countries worth approximately US$13 billion (Moyo, 2009). The 
Marshall Plan has largely been hailed as successful and set a precedent for what aid 
should look like in the twentieth century. The Marshall Plan’s directive helped restore 
Europe and returned the continent to the economic powerhouse and rich cultural hub that 
it was pre-war. What proponents of the Marshall Plan have failed to realize, however, is 
that Europe, while damaged, had an existing physical, legal and social infrastructure that 
simply needed fixing (Moyo, 2009). Since the continent already had a strong framework 
around which to rebuild, it appears obvious that all that was needed was a capital 
injection in order to emerge as a world leader. The success of the Marshall Plan ushered 
in the prevailing view that investment capital was critical for economic growth (Moyo, 
2009), and indeed, today’s development aid sector was largely designed after the 
Marshall Plan’s model of large injections of cash and capital. After all, if it worked in 
Europe, it surely would work elsewhere. 
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 The following decades of development aid could largely be characterized by the 
prevailing mindsets that dominated each era regarding how development should be 
approached, how low-income nation-states were viewed by the developed world, the role 
NGOs played in development, and the dominant discourse that dictated aid’s role.  
 The 1950’s was dominated by the idea that comprehensive economic planning 
was essential to growth. Low-income nation states were seen as sovereign and 
autonomous. It was believed that by responsibly managing domestic resources, each 
nation state could achieve modernization; foreign technical assistance could assist in 
achieving modernization more quickly. The role of NGOs during this period was seen as 
minor. They mainly were only called upon for emergency relief purposes (Chabbot, 
1999).  
 The 1960’s brought the decade of industrialization. This decade emphasized using 
aid funding for large scale industrial projects (such as roads and railways), since it was 
believed that these projects had long-term payoffs and were not likely to be financed by 
the private sector (Moyo, 2009). Low-income nation states, while still viewed as 
sovereign nations, were seen as dependent on high-income countries for this foreign 
investment. This was different from the previous decade, where low-income nations were 
viewed as responsible for their own development (Chabbot, 1999). The 1960’s also saw a 
rise in material affluence in developed nations, which was attributed to new citizen 
attitudes. This affluence created a solid middle class whose concerns were no longer 
solely rooted in material and economic stability, and extended to equity and social justice 
(Ahmed & Potter, 2006). The role of NGOs during this time was limited to technical 
assistance and the management of schools and hospitals, many of which the NGOs were 
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already managing (Chabbot, 1999). But while NGOs were largely attributed with running 
these small-scale operations, it was also realized that they had a pulse on what was 
occurring “on the ground” in these low-income nations, which made them the perfect 
conduits through which to address citizens’ social justice concerns.  
In the 1970’s, aid began to change directions, and took a poverty focus. As in the 1960’s, 
the dominant view of the state having ultimate accountability remained, but now there 
was an added element of state responsibility for ensuring that development did not 
exacerbate any existing inequalities among the population (Chabbot, 1999). In 1973, the 
Arab oil crisis occurred, sending the world economy into a state of turmoil (Moyo, 2009; 
Salamon, 1994). Middle Eastern oil exporting countries placed an embargo on oil in 
response to the United States’ support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War. As a result of 
this embargo, oil prices around the world soared. Of course, oil exporting nations 
pocketed a large profit off of these increased prices. These oil exporting nations deposited 
the cash into international banks, who then, flush with heavy cash reserves, lent this 
money to the developing world. Now developing countries were borrowing more and as a 
result, increased their debt burden. As oil prices rose, food and commodities prices also 
rose and much of the developing world saw a recession take hold (Moyo, 2009). This, of 
course, led to increased poverty and destitution in developing countries. As poverty levels 
continued to increase, the Western world began to place conditions on their development 
support: governments of low-income countries would need to demonstrate their 
commitment and ability to alleviate poverty among their populations. It is at this time that 
many donors began to use what are now commonly known as development indicators, 
such as infant mortality rates and other quality of life indicators (Chabbot, 1999).  In the 
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mid-1970, approximately two-thirds of aid was still being channeled to large 
infrastructure projects, but the proportion of development aid going to poverty-oriented 
programs had increased from 5% in the late 1970’s to 50% by the early 1980s (Moyo, 
2009). NGOs were also increasingly seen as instrumental in being able to assist in 
carrying out poverty alleviation programs. While their overall role was still somewhat 
limited in terms of the scope that they now encompass today, they were now taking on 
small-scale rural social service delivery pilot projects and engaging in grassroots 
advocacy that empowered the poor and made them active participants in development 
programs (Chabbot, 1999; Salamon, 1994). 
 The aid theme of the 1980’s was that development aid should be used as a tool for 
stabilization and structural adjustment. In 1982, Mexico’s Secretary of Finance called the 
United States Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the United States Secretary of the 
Treasury and the IMF’s managing director to inform that that Mexico would be unable to 
meet its upcoming debt obligations to international bank creditors. This became an issue 
that was mirrored across the world, and many other countries soon announced that they, 
too, would be unable to meet their debt obligations (Moyo, 2009). This crisis threatened 
to crash the global financial sphere, and lenders and creditors alike knew that a solution 
needed to be created in order to avoid a catastrophic global financial crisis. Because the 
developing world had sank so far into crushing debt, could no longer meet its debt 
obligations, and continued to spiral into poverty despite the poverty-alleviation programs 
that had begun to be enacted in the 1970s, donors decided to enact stabilization policies 
and then structural adjustment, which eventually gave way to a series of structural 
adjustment programs. Stabilization meant reducing a country’s imbalances to reasonable 
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levels, such as the government’s fiscal position and the country’s import-export ratio 
(Moyo, 2009). Structural adjustment was basically a free-market approach to solving the 
economic woes of each developing nation. It encouraged trade liberalization and the 
removal of subsidies (Moyo, 2009). Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) placed a 
series of “conditionalities” on countries in order for them to both continue to receive aid 
and quality for lower interest rates on loans. The intent of the SAPs was to enable the 
developing nations to be able to pay down the enormous debt that they had incurred in 
the previous decade. One of the ways in which SAPs were structured (one of these 
“conditionalities”) was that developing countries’ governments had to reduce spending.  
Unfortunately, this meant that many governments slashed spending on social programs, 
many of which benefitted the poor. Without these critical social programs, populations 
sank further into poverty and were unable to rely on resources that previously had been 
available to them. It is at this point that NGOs began to emerge as powerful substitutes 
for the state by providing many of the social services that the state could no longer afford 
to offer. The World Bank incorporated various activities in order to soften the effects of 
these SAPs, which mainly focused on a country’s governmental ability to monitor the 
SAP effects on the poor. At the same time, the World Bank promoted NGO programs to 
mitigate those effects (Chabbot, 1999). Effectively, NGOs emerged as a “third sector”—
neither public nor private, yet responsible for the provision of services that the state could 
not provide to its population.  
 The 1980’s also saw the rise of the school of thought known as “neoliberalism.” 
Neoliberalism emerged as the solution to the critique of the welfare state. It advocated for 
a small government and for the free market as the solution to economic woes. The 
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neoliberal philosophy included rallying for reducing trade barriers, privatizing public 
sector activities, and deregulating industry. The line of thinking believed that services 
that were normally provided by the public sector should be privatized (Edwards, 2000). 
The structural adjustment programs run by the World Bank and the IMF largely derived 
the program structure from this neoliberal line of thinking. The negative repercussions of 
this school of thought would eventually be felt further down the line. 
 The 1990s aid paradigm focused on the idea that governance was the reason for 
aid failure and good governance was needed for sustainable economic growth. Good 
governance was synonymous with strong, reputable institutions, a democratic rule of law 
and corruption-free economies (Moyo, 2009). The 1990s also was concerned with 
sustainable development. Themes of this decade provided a broader mandate for 
development organizations to scrutinize the governments in low-income countries, which 
only served to further erode government autonomy. Both bilateral and multilateral 
donors, in the aftermath of the Cold War, began to pursue a “new policy agenda” which 
elevated NGOs and gave them prominence in poverty alleviation, social welfare and civil 
society development (Bagci, 2003). Eventually, NGOs became the social service delivery 
agents of choice for most aid donors and became an essential counterweight to traditional 
state power (Chabbott, 1999; Bagci, 2003). Additionally, the West started to become 
increasingly concerned with the spread of democracy throughout the world. Democracy, 
according to the Western powers, was the way by which countries would experience 
economic growth and development. In the West’s mind, democracy was the answer to 
successful aid—it was the ultimate key (Moyo, 2009). Two themes dominated the foreign 
aid agenda of the 1990s. First, the multilateral agencies (i.e., World Bank and the United 
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Nations Development Programme) dominated the lending and provided the most money 
for development purposes. Much of this aid was made available on a concessional basis, 
and the vast majority of it was in the form of grants—more than 90% of official 
development aid was constituted by grants by 1996. Second, donor fatigue started to set 
in towards the end of the decade (Moyo, 2009). This fatigue paved the way for the 
upcoming decade, which saw the rise of a different type of aid altogether. 
 The 2000s was characterized by the rise of “glamour aid.” The President of 
Tanzania gave a speech in February of 2005, in which he excoriated the aid industry, 
calling it a “scandal that we are forced to choose between basic health and education for 
our people and repaying historical debt” (Moyo, 2009). This fatigue opened the door for 
celebrities to begin to campaign to raise money for aid assistance. Raising money for 
emergency aid and humanitarian disasters had proven to be a huge success in the past, 
and this success was replicated in raising money for development aid. Despite all of the 
different faces and phases of aid, it has become apparent that aid is not working as 
effectively or efficiently as its designers have intended. Donors, policymakers, and 
development agencies alike need to examine other potential aid failure reasons, as it is 
clear that aid has had uneven success (Moyo, 2009).  
 
Cooperation & Coordination  
 It is important to distinguish between the terms “cooperation” and “coordination.” 
Cooperation entails working together to achieve a common outcome, whereas 
coordination is about avoiding getting in each other’s way (Chandy & Kharas, 2011). 
Typically, most of the literature focuses on aid coordination—coordination is, by default, 
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easier to achieve and entails much less communication than true cooperation. Both 
cooperation and coordination are important elements that are needed for the successful 
provision of public goods, but given that collective action theory involves working 
together to achieve a common goal, cooperation is going to produce more effective 
outcomes than simply coordination. 
 The issue of aid effectiveness has been on the international agenda for years, but 
the focus has overwhelmingly been on coordination.  The Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda for Action both explicitly address coordination between countries, donors, and 
sectors, but do not address or mention cooperation. The Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation in 2011 was one of the first major documents to spell out the 
need for cooperation and explicitly called for inclusive development partnerships 
(Bigsten & Tengstaum, n.d.). Both cooperation and coordination are critical in the quest 
for effective public goods provision. 
 Cooperation implies that a group of individuals is working together, but it does 
not mention whether this cooperation is voluntary or coerced. While it might seem 
irrelevant to distinguish whether cooperation is voluntary or coerced (after all, the 
outcome of cooperation is what many are most interested in), it is, in fact, an important 
distinction to make. There are information costs associated with coerced cooperation. If 
cooperation is coerced, that means a central authority is needed in order to enforce it, and 
that central authority will be disadvantaged when it comes to receiving or collecting 
information. Additionally, there are positive benefits associated with voluntary 
cooperation that are lost when cooperation is coerced (Gillinson, 2004). Grootaert (2001) 
found that in a study of cooperative water projects in least developed countries (LDC’s), 
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returns seen in voluntary projects were greater than those returns seen when these water 
projects were enforced by the government.  
 Voluntary cooperation can be either purely voluntary (motivated by the desire for 
goodwill or even the fear of societal sanctions) or incentivized. Cooperation that is 
motivated by goodwill is the most effective form of cooperation and will generally 
produce the best outcomes, because the information costs are low and participant 
commitment is enhanced (Gillinson, 2004). Titmuss’s study (1970) on blood donation 
argued that voluntary blood donation would produce greater quantities than incentivized 
(financial) blood donation, because the desire to do good would motivate people more 
than the desire for financial compensation. When compensation is offered, people would 
be tempted to conceal bloodborne diseases, such as Hepatitis B or HIV. In addition, 
under an incentivized system, many people would donate out of financial desperation, 
even if they are not necessarily qualified to give blood. This action actually increases 
negative externalities (ill health) and places a strain on the health care system (Gillinson, 
2004). Mellstrom and Johannesson (2010) tested this blood donation theory and found 
that Titmuss was actually partially correct. In this study, subjects were divided into three 
different treatment groups: the first group was asked to donate without any financial 
compensation, the second group was offered financial compensation in exchange for 
donating, and the third group was given the choice between receiving financial 
compensation or donating that financial compensation to charity. The results showed that, 
although among men, there were no significant effects between the three experiment 
groups, among women, the number of willing donors decreased by almost half when 
financial compensation was offered. While incentivized cooperation still induces people 
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to cooperate, it is not as effective as purely voluntary cooperation that is motivated out of 
goodwill. 
 Cooperation and coordination are critical to the successful provision of public 
goods and failure to do so is sub-optimal for several reasons. First, it results in 
fragmentation and incomplete information. Fragmentation is costly for both recipients 
and for donors (Halonen-Akatwijuka, 2007), and incomplete information can lead to 
negative consequences. In the extreme, failure to cooperate and coordinate can cause 
disastrous consequences. One example of such a failure occurred in Banda Aceh, 
Indonesia in the aftermath of the devastating tsunami that swept the country in 2005. A 
little girl presented to physicians with an unusual case of measles. Upon rigorous 
examination and interviews, it was discovered that the girl had actually received the 
measles vaccination three times, from three different organizations, and her symptoms 
were the result of her over-vaccination. Second, failure to cooperate and coordinate leads 
to resource misallocation and inefficiencies (Chandy & Kharas, 2011). An example of 
this would be if NGOs are notified that a certain population segment or area of a country 
needs an increase in medication and do not coordinate or cooperate to determine 
distribution, that particular population segment or area might receive too much 
medication at the expense of another group receiving needed and critical medication. 
Third, it can result in waste (Cooley & Ron, 2002). Returning to the previous example, 
the population segment that was overloaded with medications could mean that a lot of 
those medications go to waste because they are unable to be used before their expiration 
date. Finally, failure to coordinate and cooperate can result in duplication of programs 
and services (Barr & Fafchamps, 2006). If more than one NGO is operating in an area 
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and providing the same or similar services, duplication occurs and a situation such as the 
Banda Aceh story is likely to happen. 
 
Levels of Cooperation 
 How is cooperation to be assessed? It is more than just simply assessing if it is 
occurring or if it is not occurring. Cooperation has been broken down into levels and 
“operationalized” by Koch (2011). Koch delineates three levels of cooperation, from 
Level I (a low level of cooperation) to Level III (a high level of cooperation).  
 Level I cooperation has high selective benefits for NGOs as individual 
organizations, but does not necessarily have benefits for the group. This level of 
cooperation is most often applied to joint fundraising efforts or proposal writing resource 
workshops. Olson (1971) states that this type of cooperation can occur between groups, 
and various social psychologists believe that if the interests of the various groups are in 
alignment, cooperation is likely to occur at this level (Koch, 2011). 
 Level II cooperation provides selective benefits for individual NGOs and also for 
the group. Examples of this type of cooperation include the establishment of joint training 
centers for staff or a joint quality control system. Overall, these types of activities 
improve the quality of operations work of the individual organizations and improve the 
overall quality of the output. Some benefits accrue to the individual NGOs, but the 
majority of the benefits that are created accumulate to the group as a whole. This type of 
cooperation is believed to occur in small groups, and as group size increases (which 
increases agglomeration), decreasing selective benefits result in decreasing levels of 
cooperation (Olson, 1971; Koch, 2011). Olson (1971) believes this type of cooperation is 
	 32 
the maximum level of cooperation that can exist and that only specific types of groups 
will actually achieve Level II cooperation. 
 Level III cooperation results in selective benefits for individual NGOs while high 
benefits accrue for the group. The type of cooperation that occurs at this level includes 
activities like coordination of regional and thematic priorities. These types of activities 
are good for the group as a whole because they help to reduce waste, duplication of 
services and reduce inefficiencies. This type of cooperation is seen as difficult to obtain, 
as this type of cooperation generally requires that any competition is set aside. In an 
environment where resources are often scarce and survival takes precedence, this type of 
cooperation is very scarce. Some do believe that this type of cooperation can occur if the 
collective benefits are high enough (Wade, 1988) 
 
Cooperation & Coordination Among NGOs  
 The issue of coordination in the health sector began to receive attention in the 
1990’s as calls for increased aid effectiveness became louder. What followed were four 
distinct transitions: coordination within the sector, sector-wide coordination, coordination 
across sectors at the national level and, most recently, global-level coordination (Hill, 
Dodd & Haffeld, 2012).  
 Once it became evident that fragmentation and duplication of services were 
serious issues in international aid, the call for coordination within the health sector was 
put out. This coordination was mainly donor-driven and mainly occurred only among 
donors and was not done in conjunction with other stakeholders within the health sector. 
Donors essentially tried to formalize their coordination activities within the sector 
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amongst themselves (Hill, Dodd & Haffeld, 2012). Eventually, within-sector 
coordination gave way to sector-wide coordination, or sector-wide approaches (SWAp’s). 
SWAps differed from within-sector coordination in that it aimed to coordinate the entire 
health sector and its accompanying resources, instead of coordinating parts of a whole 
from within the sector. SWAps moved the coordination responsibility from donors to 
national governments, and they also elevated the dialogue from simply discussing various 
project guidelines and implementation plans to creating national policy frameworks. 
While the SWAp concept was an improvement in coordination efforts, it was plagued by 
issues; donors were generally very supportive of SWAps but administrative rules and 
bureaucracy prohibited many of them from being able to participate in certain instances. 
In addition, weak governance and lack of transparency at the national level created issues 
that the health sector was incapable of addressing. Eventually, the concept of SWAps had 
to be redesigned (Hill, Dodd & Haffeld, 2012). 
 Although SWAps were not as successful as their creators had hoped, they did lend 
some important central tenants—namely, local leadership, local policy alignment, and 
harmonization—to the coordination approach’s next iteration, which was national level 
coordination. The national level coordination approach began with Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which were originally a World Bank requirement in order for 
countries to remain eligible to receive new loans and continue to qualify for low interest 
rates (Hill, Dodd & Haffeld, 2012). PRSPs describe a country’s macroeconomic, 
structural and social policies and programs and aim to promote growth and reduce 
poverty (International Monetary Fund, 2014). PRSPs quickly became a way for 
governments and donors to align priorities and initiatives. However, as with SWAps, 
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weak governance and lack of national-level transparency caused national-level 
coordination to fail (Hill, Dodd & Haffeld, 2012).  
 The 2000s ushered in the era of global coordination. The issue of coordination 
received increased attention and focus, and the rapid increase in stakeholders (global civil 
society networks, private foundations, etc) demanded a new type of coordination effort. 
As the donor landscape continues to add new members, the pressure for coordination at 
every level (national, sectoral, and even disease-specific) increases (Hill, Dodd & 
Haffeld, 2012). While coordination efforts indeed have, at their core, good intentions, it 
appears that the focus has remained on the intention rather than any type of coordination 
achievement. Focus needs to remain on achievement if coordination improvements are 
actually to be made. 
 The question then becomes: if cooperation and coordination are good and result in 
positive results, why are organizations choosing not to do so? First, although NGOs have 
altruistic missions, they still compete with each other for resources, which, oftentimes, 
are scarce (Cooley & Ron, 2002; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010; Molenaers, Jacobs & 
Dellepiane, 2014). The presence of many NGOs in an environment, combined with the 
fact that many of these NGOs are working in the same sphere, means that they compete 
with each other for resources. Many times, these NGOs are trying to win contracts and 
obtain funding from the same donors, and this does not decrease a competitive 
atmosphere, it only exacerbates it. This is known as the multiple principles problem. The 
more “agents” (NGOs) there are, the more each NGO’s position and survival might seem 
insecure or tenuous, and therefore NGOs will seek to undermine other NGOs (who are 
seen as competitors), hide information and act unilaterally (Ron & Cooley, 2002). 
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 Second, cooperation and coordination require time, effort, and resources; NGOs 
do not necessarily have any of these elements. In an environment where resources are 
already scarce, finding additional resources is difficult. In addition, cooperation and 
coordination usually require regular meetings or communication, which take time and 
effort. In environments where NGO’s are already stretched thin, it is difficult to entice 
management to work voluntarily with other organizations when it takes time away from 
their own daily work. Third, there is no incentive for NGOs to work together. While it 
may be socially optimal for them to do so, working together does not necessarily provide 
any immediate and measureable impact that would entice organizations to cooperate and 
coordinate. In addition to no incentive being given, there are also no negative 
consequences or punishments that are handed down as a result of not working together. 
The lack of incentive and the lack of negative consequences will make it very difficult to 
encourage NGOs to work together. Finally, it is critical to keep in mind that most NGOs 
receive funding from donors on the basis of project and program success. There is a 
heavy emphasis on being able to produce measureable results (number of vaccines given, 
percentage decrease in disease prevalence, percentage decrease in infant mortality, etc) to 
demonstrate to donors that a particular NGO is capable and competent at carrying out 
contracts and managing funds. When NGOs work together, it becomes not only difficult 
but nearly impossible for an individual NGO to demonstrate that it was the sole reason 
for the success of a program; the other NGO or NGOs who also worked on the project 
cannot necessarily be disentangled from the others in being able to prove success. In a 
competitive environment where future funding is usually contingent on past successes, 
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working together threatens the survivability of NGOs and threatens their future funding. 
Each NGO wants to be able to demonstrate successful results to donors. 
 Several studies have been conducted on cooperation between and among NGOs. 
Ron and Cooley (2002) conducted three separate case studies that illustrated the 
“multiple principles problem” in the NGO environment. The first case study consisted of 
30 interviews with for-profit corporations in Kyrgyzstan that were operating under one-
year renewable contracts from various Western governments, the United Nations and 
international financial institutions. This case study showed that the reliance on short-term 
contracts created an environment of competition, and it also motivated contractors to 
withhold and hide information that might negatively influence the renewal of the 
following year’s contract. The presence of several donors in the same sector created a 
multitude of problems, including project implementation delays and even project 
cancellations, all as a result of inter-organizational competition (Ron & Cooley, 2002). 
This particular case study suffered from a major limitation in that it studied only for-
profit entities; however, it should be noted that in competitive environments, non-profit 
entities will often behave in the same or similar ways as their for-profit counterparts. If 
organizational survival is at stake, the incentive to compete in order to win new contracts 
is high. The second case study drew on 35 discussions with employees of a large, 
respected non-profit organization that operated a refugee camp in Goma, Democratic 
Republic of Congo during the period of the Rwandan genocide. During that time, more 
than 200 organizations set up operations in Goma in the hopes of securing UN contracts. 
Even though it was a common belief that more organizations would mean better and 
more efficient services for refugees, this was not the case. The presence of so many 
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organizations created an environment of competition where the overarching concern was 
the securing of a contract. This resulted in suboptimal services for the refugee population. 
The third case study took place in Bosnia during the Bosnian War in the 1990’s. The 
presence of a multitude of NGOs created uncertainty and competition among the 
organizations. One source stated that the local NGOs were “quick to fall into competition 
with each other, vying for donor attention and funding” (Ron & Cooley, 2002). This 
competition undercuts cooperation and makes cooperation virtually impossible, as 
organizational survival takes precedence over working together to achieve a common 
goal. 
 Another study on aid fragmentation was conducted in Belgium. Since it was 
recognized that aid fragmentation results in high transaction costs, administrative overlap, 
and undermines aid effectiveness overall, a specific case in Belgium was investigated. 
Belgium received heavy criticism from the OECD because it suffered from a lack of 
synergy between the Belgian Directorate General of Development Cooperation and NGO 
aid (Molenaers, Jacobs, & Dellepiane, 2014). A total of 115 NGOs were included in the 
study sample (which also happens to be the number of NGOs receiving official 
development aid from Belgium). The sample showed that 40% of NGOs coordinate 
assistance with their own partners in several areas, including problem identification, 
coordination, exchange of information, project execution and monitoring and evaluation. 
The NGOs also claim to cooperate with other local organizations and the local 
government, but this cooperation is not as involved as the cooperation with identified 
partners—only 20% self-reported as working closely with these other entities and 
government. Overall, the NGOs themselves stated that there was a lack of 
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communication and coordination among each other and other development actors in 
Belgium (Molenaers, Jacobs & Dellepiane, 2014).  
 Koch (2011) conducted a study that examined cooperation among NGOs. The 
overall question was whether agglomeration of NGOs enhances or decreases cooperation. 
The study took place in a simulated environment with 37 NGOs, consisted of three 
rounds, and was a repeated interaction game. A total of four to six NGOs played against 
each other in each game, but they also had to cooperate as a team against other NGO 
teams that were playing the game. There were two possible “winning” situations (one in 
which a prize was given for the NGO that ended the game with the most money, and 
another in which a prize was given for the NGO that ended with the most joint projects 
for the community). These two winning situations were meant to replicate the types of 
dilemmas that NGOs face: do NGOs prefer financial security or do they actually 
cooperate to achieve better outcomes for their target population? The results showed that 
agglomeration did actually decrease cooperation levels and enhanced competition. To 
supplement the game results, the study authors also conducted 47 semi-structured 
interviews with NGOs working in Arusha, Tanzania. The NGOs were independent from 
the government, all were classified as non-profit, they were funded by foreign donors, 
had local offices in the region and were carrying out projects in the Arusha area (response 
rate was 67%). The survey findings concluded that although there was some cooperation 
occurring among the NGOs located in the city, they cooperated fewer hours per week 
than those NGOs that were located in less agglomerated areas. In addition, NGOs that 
worked in very rural areas also cooperated less than those NGOs that were located in 
semi-remote regions (medium agglomeration). Overall, cooperation rose with increasing 
	 39 
agglomeration but it decreased when agglomeration reached a certain high level (Koch, 
2011). International NGOs were more apt to cooperate with other NGOs, and this was 
thought to be because their funding was more secure than local NGOs. NGOs were 
generally only willing to cooperate when clear benefits to their organization were 
guaranteed and stopped cooperating when organizational benefits were not guaranteed, 
which supported Olson’s theory of collective action.  
 
Health NGOs, Public Goods, and the Need for Collective Action 
 Today, NGOs are seen by governments and donors as a much better conduit 
through which to channel aid to provide services than country governments (Zaidi, 1999). 
Plagued with perceptions of corruption, developing country governments are often 
bypassed by aid dollars and instead must rely on NGOs to deliver the bulk of aid services 
and projects. NGOs are increasingly seen as the solution for all ills that afflict 
underdeveloped countries, and additionally, any issue that the private or public sectors 
cannot address is automatically expected to be undertaken and delivered by NGOs (Zaidi, 
1999). In fact, NGOs deliver more development assistance today than the entire UN 
system (Mathews, 1997). While the exact number of NGOs that exist in the world today 
is unknown, it can be said to probably be in the millions.  
 Many NGOs in developing countries provide health care, which this paper has 
established as a global public good. Public goods are best and most efficiently provided 
when collective action—that is to say, cooperation—occurs. The question remains, 
however, what levels of cooperation are occurring between NGOs in the health sector. 
This is an important policy issue, as financing of development activity has received 
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increased scrutiny over the years, especially following the worldwide economic crisis of 
2008. Resources need to be channeled effectively and efficiently, and outcomes need to 
improve. Lack of collective action produces waste, duplication of services, and overall 
inefficiencies. If collective action is one of the keys to greater efficiency and better 
outcomes, it follows that it is necessary to know both the level of cooperation that is 
currently occurring and the barriers to cooperation so that specific policy measures can be 
designed to encourage collective action. 
 Collective action appears simple in theory, but in reality, it is very difficult to 
achieve. Although it may be optimal and may produce the most effective and efficient 
outcomes in the delivery of global public goods, it is difficult to achieve for many 
reasons. In the case of NGOs, a competitive environment exists in which the need for 
survival trumps the desire to effectively and efficiently deliver services. Even when 
collective action does exist, there are still barriers to success. One of these barriers is the 
free-rider problem, in which some actors will not participate in collective action yet 
receive some of the benefits of collective action. In addition, it becomes more difficult to 
deliver public goods optimally and efficiently as the size of the group increases. Given 
that there are often a large number of NGOs in developing countries trying to deliver 
services in the same sector, collective action will be difficult to achieve. 
 Yet, while collective action will, in practice, be difficult to achieve, it is an issue 
worth investigating. Its study will uncover information on why it is not achieving that 
may be specific to the sector in which the organizations work (in this case, health). Is the 
failure of collective action one of the underlying, unexplored reasons why aid has been an 
overall failure? 
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 While some progress has been made, it seems that the same mistakes are made 
time and time again, and aid continues to fail. Aid failure has been the subject of many 
papers, policy documents, and presentations, yet no one seems to have the answer as to 
why it is failing. As Kaul et al. (1999) states, “The pervasiveness of today’s crises 
suggests that they might all suffer from a common cause, such as a common flaw in 
policy making, rather than from issue specific problems. If so, issue specific responses, 
typical to date, would be insufficient—allowing global crises to persist and even 
multiply” (p. xxi). While the “common cause” by which all aid seems to fail may be 
difficult to uncover, it is worth trying to uncover issues that previously have not been 
considered. As Kaul and colleagues (1999) also suggest, is it time to look at a possible 
deeper reason for why we are not succeeding? Is it time for a change in perspective? 
 A change in perspective would imply that deeper causes of aid failure perhaps 
need to be examined. The traditional reasons given, including failures by donor countries, 
donor institutions, and recipient governments, are easy targets and therefore receive most 
of the blame. However, there may be deeper, underlying reasons why aid is failing. 
NGOs, while traditionally seen as the “saviors” for aid implementation, are a part of the 
aid problem. It is only recently that they have received any scrutiny for failing to deliver 
and implement aid properly. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation recently put out a 
series of reports assessing donor coordination in global health, stating that the 
“proliferation of donors has created challenges for negotiating, coordinating, and 
delivering effective programs that strengthen country ownership, support civil society, 
and uphold other established principles for development assistance” (Henry J. Kaiser 
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Family Foundation, 2014). While the examination of donor involvement and coordination 
is surely beneficial for trying to understand previously unexamined underlying causes of 
aid failure, it neglects to study another very important piece of the puzzle, which are 
NGOs. NGOs deliver the vast majority of aid, yet are not always scrutinized in the same 
manner that donors and recipient governments have been. While studying donor 
coordination and cooperation is indeed relevant, NGO cooperation and coordination 
should also be studied. Much can be learned from studying this “third sector” and how it 
provides public goods. Where are the inefficiencies? How are NGOs working (or not 
working) together to provide services? Indeed, the literature has highlighted the 
limitations of public actors in providing public goods, and inter-organizational 
cooperation is needed (Steffek, 2013). 
 NGOs provide an array of services, including health services, in Haiti. Health 
services are largely needed in the country, as Haiti has the worst health statistics and the 
worst health outcomes in the western hemisphere. The life expectancy is only 62 years, 
maternal mortality is 380 per 100,000 live births, and only 37% of women give birth in 
health facilities with skilled birth attendants, to give a brief overview. Communicable 
disease also remains a serious issue: the malaria prevalence rate is 2% to 3%, HIV/AIDS 
prevalence is 2.2%, and tuberculosis remains a problem, with almost 14,000 new TB 
cases reported in 2010 alone (World Health Organization, 2015). Cholera also continues 
to pose a threat to the country. In 2010, shortly following the devastating earthquake that 
hit Port au Prince, a cholera outbreak began that quickly swept through the country, 
killing thousands and affecting hundreds of thousands. While the epidemic has already 
reached its peak, it still continues to affect many in the country today 
	 43 
 Haiti in particular has a high number of NGOs currently operating, with estimates 
being as high as 10,000 in existence. This has led to Haiti being dubbed the “Republic of 
NGOs,” as Haiti has the second-highest number of NGOs in operation in the world, 
behind India  (Farmer, 2011; Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010). Haiti is often propped up as the 
prototypical failed state—a “little piece of sub-Saharan Africa” (Edmonds, 2012).  Haiti 
received almost $1.3 billion in official development aid (ODA) in 2012 (World Bank, 
2012). Over 25% of all ODA is allocated to health and population, which also happens to 
be the sector that receives the highest proportion of aid (OECD, 2013). Despite the 
money that flows into Haiti each year and is specifically allocated to health, Haiti 
continues to have the worst health outcomes in the western hemisphere and health has not 
significantly improved. It is fair to say that the best efforts of Haiti’s NGOs have failed to 
build a stronger state, failed to strengthen infrastructure, and failed to provide the 
necessary services to the population.  
 Given the high number of NGOs, the dismal health outcomes, the high amount of 
ODA that flows to Haiti, and the increased scrutiny on fiscal spending, Haiti is an ideal 
environment in which to study collective action in the provision of health, a global public 
good. To what extent is the failure of NGOs to help produce sufficient outcomes a result 
of a lack of collective action? What levels of cooperation are occurring, if any, between 
health NGOs in Haiti? What incentives would encourage collective action? Given that it 
has been difficult to pinpoint why failures are occurring, and also given that prior 
research has stated that it is time to shift the focus to NGO accountability instead of 
continuing to scrutinize donors, it follows that this case study will advance the research 
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agenda and contribute meaningful results that can be applied on a practical level to the 
field of global health. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter outlines the research methodology for the study. Given the 
justification that was presented in the previous section, Haiti remains an excellent 
research site for the investigation of the level of collective action that is occurring, or not 
occurring, among NGOs.  
 I personally spent a year as the executive director of a non-profit that operates a 
health clinic in a rural area of Haiti. Even though Haiti has thousands of NGOs, when I 
began the position, I did not know if any other health NGOs worked in the area, and upon 
inquiring about this to the board of directors, was told that they had “heard” of some 
other health NGOs but were not sure of the name or who ran them, despite the fact that 
this particular organization had been in operation for almost 15 years at the time. This 
inspired me to start some preliminary, non-academic research to find other health NGOs 
with whom we might partner. I was able to connect with one other organization that also 
worked in health, and this organization was able to provide needed services to some of 
my organization’s patients that the clinic could not. Likewise, my organization was able 
to provide some contacts and assistance with shipments to the other organization. This 
led me to wonder: if two organizations working together could increase efficiency and 
offer improved and expanded services, what could a network of health organizations do? 
Olson’s (1971) seminal work has ultimately inspired a plethora of research into 
organizational cooperation, including my own. My particular outreach had been done 
voluntarily—were there others doing the same? If not, what could incentivize health 
organizations to engage in collective action? 
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 Armed with these questions, I set out to design my dissertation research, which 
was to study collective action occurring among NGOs working in maternal and child 
health in Haiti. Starting with my own short list of NGO contacts, through snowball 
sampling, I recruited additional participants to complete a 25-question, semi-structured 
interview protocol. The results of the interview were analyzed qualitatively via thematic 
analysis. During the interview, participants were also asked to generate a list of all NGOs 
working in maternal and child health in Haiti, then to identify various levels of 
cooperation with the NGOS with which they each worked. This data were analyzed using 
social network analysis.  
 Two formal research questions were developed in anticipation of this research: 
RQ1: What is the level of cooperation that is occurring between NGOs working 
in maternal and child health in Haiti?  
RQ2: What incentives would encourage NGOs to cooperate?  
 
 This research study entailed a mixed-methods approach to data collection. Data 
collection entailed the use of a semi-structured, 24 question interview protocol. Further, 
internet research was completed on each participating organization, in order to collect 
information on the incorporation of collaboration and partnerships into each 
organization's mission, vision and/or values, which was then measured against some of 
the qualitative data. 
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Participants  
 In order to gain a better understanding of organizational cooperative behavior, 
semi-structured interviews took place with people who were managers or executives of 
NGOs that work in some aspect of maternal and child health in Haiti. It was theorized 
that managers and executives establish not only the overall mission and goals for an 
organization, but that they also strategize how the mission and goals will be achieved. 
Therefore, managers and executives are in an excellent position to describe the 
importance (or non-importance) of collective action, as well as assess the level at which it 
is occurring. 
 Semi-structured interviews occurred with 17 participants. I identified and 
contacted seven participants by virtue of my own personal relationships through my time 
spent working in Haiti. Each of these participants listed other organizations with which 
s/he works or with which s/he was familiar. I selected additional participants using a 
snowball sampling method. Researchers can often use snowball sampling in an attempt to 
access marginalized or hard-to-reach populations (Atkinson & Flint, 2004). In this 
particular instance, a snowball sampling method was chosen because it is difficult to 
pinpoint NGOs working in Haiti, much less NGOs working in a particular area. There is 
no central database whereby NGOs can be found, and there is no official registration 
process for NGOs operating in Haiti. Indeed, NGOs can operate in Haiti without being 
officially recognized by the government as such. This is a large factor in what makes it so 
difficult to track NGOs in Haiti. The use of snowball sampling in organic social networks 
is useful for bringing to light two important concepts: social knowledge and power 
relations (Noy, 2008). While snowball sampling has sometimes been viewed as a “last 
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resort” sampling method when other options have been exhausted, it is, in its own right, a 
particularly informative procedure that delivers a unique type of knowledge (Noy, 2008). 
Snowball sampling in this research afforded the opportunity to examine existing 
knowledge (or lack of knowledge) among NGO social networks and the subsequent 
power relations and dynamics that occur between organizations. By virtue of referrals, I 
examined existing networks and used this information to analyze how these networks 
interact with each other, knowledge that might not be observable in using a traditional 
random sampling method. Additionally, participants who work for NGOs could be 
reluctant to share data if it is not tied to donor funding. Using a snowball sampling 
method provided a way for me to be “introduced” to new organizations and networks that 
otherwise might be closed to outsiders with whom these organizations are not familiar. 
 The inclusion criteria for this study included three elements. First, the participant 
needed to be a manager or executive of an NGO. Second, the NGO needed to work in 
Haiti, though the NGO did not need to solely work in Haiti. The NGO could have 
operations in other parts of the world, but part of its operations needed to take place in 
Haiti. The third criterion was that the organization needed to work in maternal and child 
health, though the organization did not need to work exclusively in maternal and child 
health. The NGO could provide other services, so long as part of the organization’s 
services included the provision of maternal and child health. See Table 2-1 for a listing of 
participants and descriptors (mission, length of service, MCH services provided, whether 
local or non-local and operating budget). 
 The snowball sampling method proved to be useful to an extent; unfortunately, 
many emails sent to organizations by virtue of being referred were unreturned. Because 
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of this, an additional recruitment approach was utilized in order to yield a higher sample 
size. An email was sent to "The Corbett List," an email listserv that has a wide readership 
among people working in Haiti and interested in Haiti. This email list began in 1994 and 
continues to operate today. Though it is unknown how many subscribers the list currently 
has, between 1999 and 2007, 30,000 messages were posted (Corbett, n.d.). Information 
on the number of messages posted since that date is not available, but the list maintains 
an active membership, with an average of 5-10 emails sent to the list each day. I first 
learned about this list through an associate of mine, who encouraged me to sign up to 
"stay connected" to Haiti. I knew that this had the potential to be a valuable recruiting 
tool. The email that I sent to the list invited additional participants to be included in the 
research. This strategy resulted in three new participants, who also were able to give me 
additional referrals, resulting in two additional participants; the list outreach gave me a 
total of five additional participants who I would have otherwise been unable to recruit.  
 
Procedure 
 Semi-structured interviews with a total of 25 questions took place with the 
participants. Semi-structured interviews have a flexible and fluid structure (Mason, 2004; 
Galletta, 2012) and are ideal for this particular research study because they allow the 
participant and interviewer to divert from the set of interview questions to explore ideas, 
themes, and narratives that might arise during the course of the interview. Because semi-
structured interviews are relatively flexible, open and interactive, they allow for the 
interviewee to share his or her “own perspectives, perceptions, experiences, 
understandings, interpretations and interactions” (Mason, 2004, p. 1021). A more rigid 
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interviewing structure might unduly impose the researcher’s own interpretations and 
understanding onto the gathered data (Mason, 2004).  Advantages to using semi-
structured, personal interviews to elicit data include: 
1) They are ideal for exploring values, attitudes, beliefs and motives  
2) They provide the opportunity to validate participant answers through informal 
member checks (discussed later in the “Validation strategies” section) 
3) They allow for comparability of answers by ensuring that respondents answer 
all questions 
4) They avoid the issue of low-response rates that are typical of questionnaires 
(Barriball & While, 1994). 
One of the hallmarks of semi-structured interviewing is the use of probes in questioning. 
Probes are used in interviews to elicit additional explanation from participants (Roulston, 
2008). Probes allow the researcher to gather additional data that cannot be elicited in a 
structured interview; they allow for the organic emergence of new themes that might not 
result from a structured interview. Because the semi-structured interview is flexible and 
has an open-ended component, it is also idea for the exploration of areas that might not 
be well understood. It is also ideal for those who hold elite positions, as there is flexibility 
in question and answer structure and participants can explain elements that might have 
previously been unknown to the researcher, resulting in a fluid exchange between 
researcher and participant.  
 Fifteen interviews took place either over the telephone or by Skype audio call, and 
two interviews were sent via email with answers in a Microsoft Word document. This 
was necessary because cell phone coverage was very low in the areas in Haiti where 
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these two participants were located, and internet bandwidth did not allow for Skype calls. 
Audio interviews were recorded and transcribed by the researcher. All interviews took 
place in English. This was a limitation to the data collection process, as there are NGOs 
from multiple countries working in Haiti (Canada, Switzerland, France, etc). Interviews 
in French would have therefore been a way to potentially elicit more participants. 
 Interviews were halted at 17 participants because the point of data saturation had 
occurred. Data saturation is an important concept in qualitative research; since qualitative 
studies often involve labor intensive analysis, one should aim to cease collecting data 
once data saturation is reached. Data saturation is considered to have occurred "when the 
collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue under investigation" 
(Mason, 2010, para. 2). Further, if there are no new themes that are emerging, then this 
goes hand in hand with the idea that no new data needs to be collected (O’Reilly & 
Parker, 2012).  
 The major themes that were explored in my interview protocol centered around 
the type of cooperation that was occurring between organizations; the level of 
cooperation that was occurring between organizations; the limitations, barriers and 
benefits of cooperation; and specific stories about both successful and failed cooperation 
efforts. These themes were believed to be beneficial in helping to understand not only the 
type and level of collective action that was occurring in Haiti, but also to highlight and 
understand the benefits that can accrue from ongoing (and not solely in an emergency) 
organizational collective action in the global health sphere. When asked his opinion of 
the three most urgent global health issues in today's environment, Dr. William Foege, one 
of the preeminent global health leaders of modern times, stated, "Three, we need 
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collective action on improving our public health infrastructure. From global to local" 
(Foege, 2016). Advancing collective action is clearly important; first, however, it is 
necessary to evaluate what collective action is occurring, if at all. Please see the interview 
protocol in the Appendix for a list of questions (Instrument 1). 
 
Data Analysis 
 
 This section details the three methods of analysis that were utilized in this study. 
An analysis of organizational website information was conducted in order to gain insight 
into whether cooperation was incorporated into the organization's mission, values and/or 
vision. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the semi-structured interview data. Finally, 
a social network analysis was conducted in order to gain insight into the organizational 
networks that exist among actors.  
 
Internet Background Information 
 Research was conducted on each participating organization's website. I looked at 
the organization’s mission, vision, goals and values if stated and available online. In 
addition, The organization's website was investigated for mention of collaborative efforts 
or partnerships with other organizations. This would give a framework for understanding 
if collaboration was embedded in the organizational actions.  
 In addition, if available online, annual reports were studied for any mention or 
discussion of cooperation, collaboration or partnerships. Any mention of cooperation, 
collaboration, or specific partnerships was documented and incorporated into the overall 
thematic analysis. One of the semi-structured interview questions asked participants to 
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describe how their organization worked to achieve their overall mission and/or goals. In 
this, I was looking to see if how the website described the mission and goals matched up 
with what the participant stated regarding collaboration.  
 This information was used to corroborate information elicited in the interviews. I 
was looking to see if what was mentioned on the website aligned with what was 
discussed with participants in the interviews.  
 
Thematic Analysis 
 Thematic analysis was used to analyze the data. Thematic analysis does not rely 
on counting words or phrases, but moves beyond this and seeks to identify and describe 
themes, or implicit and explicit ideas that are embedded in the data (Guest, MacQueen & 
Namey, 2012).  Applied thematic analysis strives to either build theoretical models or 
find solutions to real-world problems. The intent of this particular research is to discover 
what hinders cooperation between NGOs and determine what might encourage or 
incentivize them to cooperate, ultimately resulting in suggestions on how to encourage 
cooperation for improved health outcomes, which are both “real world” problems. 
 Possible themes were identified before the interviews took place, by virtue of the 
interview protocol. These themes included areas such as: cooperation between NGOs, 
type of cooperation (information sharing, resource sharing, materials sharing, etc), 
barriers to cooperation and benefits to cooperation, among others.  
 Themes were actively identified; i.e., they did not “emerge” from the data. Stating 
that themes emerge from the data is a passive account of the analytical process, and 
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ignores the active role that the researcher plays in the entire process (Braun & Clark, 
2006). The thematic analysis consisted of the following steps: 
1) Familiarizing myself with the data 
2) Generating initial codes 
3) Searching for themes 
4) Reviewing themes 
5) Defining and naming themes (Braun & Clark, 2006). 
 
Step 1: Familiarize myself with the data 
 In this step, I familiarized myself with the data. This was done by reading and 
rereading the data, and searching for key words, trends, ideas or themes in the data 
(Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012). I made notes on potential themes that began to 
emerge, and also made note of ideas for coding (Braun & Clark, 2006).  
 Initial ideas for coding were identified on the basis of the questions themselves. 
Each question touched on an important theme in my research. Some questions 
overlapped, but all questions elicited important information from participants. These 
ideas for initial coding included: competition, barriers to cooperation, benefits of 
cooperation, and the desire to cooperate. However, knowing that there was additional 
important information in the data, these initial notes were very preliminary.  
 Transcription also occurred during this stage. Transcription is itself an important 
step in the data analysis process, as transcription allows the researcher to become familiar 
with his/her data (King & Horrocks, 2010). During the transcription phase, I was able to 
further familiarize myself with the data. I conducted partial transcription. Since I was 
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looking for common themes across a number of interviews (and not conducting a 
discourse analysis), a full, verbatim, word-for-word transcription that makes note of 
pauses, laughter, and other conversational fillers was not necessary (King & Horrocks, 
2010).  
 
Step 2: Generating initial codes 
 In this step, I generated initial codes. After reading and rereading the data, I 
concluded that I could initially identify themes on the basis of the questions themselves. 
To capture this, I did a “first round” coding that entailed structural coding. First, I made 
decisions on what type of text segmenting strategy would be utilized. Text segmentation 
defines boundaries around themes and is an important part of the analysis because it 
assesses and documents data quality and also facilitates exploration of themes, including 
their similarities, dissimilarities and relationships. The researcher has some considerable 
flexibility around where the text segment begins and ends, as well as flexibility in 
deciding how much text to include (Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012). Given that this 
flexibility exists, there is great potential for “chaos” in the analysis. To minimize this, I 
chose text boundaries that allowed the thematic features of the segment to be clearly 
distinguished when taken from the larger context of the interview (Guest, MacQueen & 
Namey, 2012). Here, questions and accompanying answers were used to identify the text 
boundaries. 
 Since themes were identified on the basis of the questions themselves, I made the 
decision to initially segment the text by question and accompanying answer.  
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 After the decision regarding text segmentation was made, I completed structural 
coding. Structural coding is used to “identify the structure imposed on a qualitative data 
set by the research questions and design” (Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012). Each 
question, accompanying answer, and any probe was considered its own structured code. 
For example, the question, “Can you think of any instances where you thought 
cooperation/collaboration might have been beneficial, but did not actually cooperate?” 
and its accompanying participant answer was assigned the code: DID NOT 
COOPERATE. A total of 31 initial structural codes were developed and on this basis, 
my codebook was formed. This structured coding resulted in my initial codes. Generating 
codes is an important step in the analysis process because it allows the researcher to 
organize the data into meaningful groups (Tuckett, 2005).  
 One of the advantages of using structural coding as my initial coding method is 
due to its usefulness in efficiently organizing the data. The thematic analysis that I 
conducted for this research used the essentialist/realist method, which reports 
experiences, meanings and the reality of the participants (Braun & Clark, 2006). This 
research did not purport to ascribe meaning to participant narratives; it simply sought to 
report the narratives themselves, and describe participant realities. 
 
Step 3: Searching for themes 
 After structural coding was finished, I read and reread my data in order to search 
for any themes. It was during this phase that additional codes were added to the 
codebook, as I identified recurring patterns of information. Additional codes were created 
to complement my initial structural coding. In total, 45 codes were included in the 
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codebook (an additional 14 codes were included, in addition to the initial 31 codes that 
were completed based on my structural coding).  
 
Themes were identified at the semantic level. This approach means that I only 
searched for themes within the explicit, or surface meanings of the data, and did not 
search for anything beyond what the participant stated (Braun & Clark, 2006).  
 There is some considerable flexibility in how the researcher defines what 
constitutes a “theme.” At the most basic level, a theme encapsulates something that is 
notable or significant about the data in relation to the research question. It will also 
represent a patterned response, at some level, within the data set (Braun & Clark, 2006). 
While there is varied agreement on how a “theme” is identified in terms of prevalence 
and space across the data set, in this research, I identified a theme in terms of the number 
of different speakers who articulated a particular theme across the data set. 
 An example of collating codes into themes comes from one of my protocol 
questions that asked participants to identify specific instances where they had 
experienced the issues of fragmentation, duplication of services, incomplete information, 
and resource misallocation (all of these are said to be consequences of failing to engage 
in collective action). While many participants were able to identify specific instances 
during this question where these instances occurred, there were clear patterns of these 
situations occurring when participants responded to other questions. One example is the 
participants’ responses to my protocol question: “Are there any instances where 
cooperation has been the intention, but it failed?” Multiple participants ascribed instances 
of failure to issues such as fragmentation, duplication of services, incomplete information 
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and/or resource misallocation. Thus, while initial structural coding had assigned a code to 
each of these (FRAGMENTATION, DUPLICATION OF SERVICES, 
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, RESOURCE MISALLOCATION), the initial 
structural codes were also identified as broader themes within the data set, given that they 
were patterned responses within the data set, and not just responses to the original 
protocol question. Another example arises from my original structural code BENEFITS. 
While I did specifically ask the question: “What are the benefits of cooperation?” there 
were several other questions throughout the protocol where participant answers included 
mentions of actual benefits resulting from cooperative experiences. Thus, on this basis, 
one of my main overarching themes was COOPERATION IS BENEFICIAL, given 
that participants continuously invoked actual benefits throughout the protocol.  
 
Step 4: Reviewing themes 
 In this step, I reviewed the codes that were identified in step 3. I took note of 
overarching themes that were occurring in the data, and was able to clearly recognize 
where codes merged into themes. This step involved a two-level process. At the first 
level, I reviewed the coded data extracts to ensure that themes formed a coherent pattern 
(Braun & Clark, 2006). Once I was satisfied, I moved on to the second level, which also 
involved reviewing the coded data, but this was done in relation to the entire data set. The 
method that I used to identify my overarching themes was done on the basis of repetition, 
which is the most common method researchers use to identify themes. I did not identify a 
specific number of times that a theme needed to be repeated in order to be included as a 
theme; this was left up to my own judgment as it related to my research’s overall analytic 
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objective (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). Generally, those patterns that were repeated 
throughout the protocol in response to several different questions were identified as 
themes.  
Step 5: Identifying and naming themes 
 In this step, I named the themes and described them in detail. I considered the 
story that the themes told me about my data (Braun & Clark, 2006). I had four main 
themes, each with accompanying subthemes. Subthemes were identified on the basis of 
repetition, much as the overarching themes. Many of the participants identified issues 
within the overarching themes that were recurring. My four, overarching themes were:  
 
 1. BARRIERS 
 2. CONSEQUENCES 
 3. COOPERATION IS BENEFICIAL 
 4. THERE IS A NEED TO COOPERATE 
 
BARRIERS: This theme describes obstacles, difficulties or impediments that hindered 
effective cooperative relationships. These could be either physical (i.e. geography, 
infrastructure, etc) or non-material (attitudes, time, etc). Subthemes included: 
competition, egos, infrastructure issues, lack of time, lack of resources and rogue groups.  
 
CONSEQUENCES: This theme describes the consequences that both can and do occur 
as a result of not cooperating. Subthemes included: duplication of services, 
fragmentation, incomplete information, and resource misallocation. 
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COOPERATION IS BENEFICIAL: This theme described the benefits to cooperation, 
both in theory and in actual instances. Subthemes included those specific benefits of 
cooperation that participants identified: share information and resources, learning from 
other organizations, providing better patient care, and maximizing efficiency. 
 
NEED TO COOPERATE: This theme described the participants’ belief that 
cooperation among NGOs was needed in Haiti, either by a formal or informal 
mechanism.  
 
Social Network Analysis 
 In addition to the themes that were identified through the interview data, 
interviews were also used to collect social network data. I gathered this data by asking 
participants a series of prompts, in which they were asked to list relationships with 
organizational actors. The social network data was exploratory only, in order to 
determine whether it could feasibly be done in the context of Haitian NGOs, given the 
limitations in trying to recruit participants  
 The first question asked participants to name all NGOs working in maternal and 
child health in Haiti. This question produced a list of actors by which I could then ask 
more specific questions that probed the nature of relationships with each actor.  
 The second question asked participants to identify all organizations with which 
they work, based on the organizational list that was compiled in response to the first 
question.  
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 The third question inquired about the type of cooperation that characterized each 
relationship. Participants were asked to characterize the type of cooperation from the 
following categories: share information, share resources and/or materials, participate in a 
joint effort (such as a meeting, workshop, or fundraising initiative) or other type of 
cooperation not listed. A level of cooperation that emerged from the probing included 
“referring patients,” so this was added as its own category. Accordingly, there were five 
categories by which organizations could characterize their cooperative relationships. 
Participants were not asked to characterize a network; they were simply asked to 
characterize the nature of their relationship with each identified organizational actor. I 
used this data to construct the networks in the social network analysis. 
 A complete list or organizations was listed in an Excel sheet, with the list of 
organizations horizontally and vertically in the sheet mirroring each other. A separate 
sheet was made for each level of cooperation: share information, share 
resources/materials, joint effort, and refer patients. Organizational relationships were 
represented by either a "0" (no relationship) or a "1" (relationship exists). These results 
were then imported into UCINET, a social network analysis software package. Measures 
of reach, density, and degree centrality were run in UCINET, and NetDraw, a UCINET 
feature that visualizes the networks, was also used to transform the dichotomous data into 
a network picture.   
 Reach is a measure of closeness and indicates how close actors are to each other 
in the social network. The reach closeness sum is less as each actor is further from each 
other—described as two steps from each other, three steps from each other, and so on 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The reach measure was useful in this study because it 
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illustrated the extent to which all actors are connected to other actors; this measure shows 
how directly tied each actor is to the other and also shows how many steps an actor has to 
go through to “reach” another actor.  
 Density measures how mutually connected a point’s contacts are to one another. 
A high-density network tells the researcher that many of a point’s contacts are directly 
connected with each other and are not solely connected through the “ego”, or focal point; 
a low-density network implies that these connections are much more segmented. Density 
is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1 representing a 100%, high-density network (Scott, 
2012). In this particular research, this measure illustrated the extent to which 
fragmentation exists in the NGO network under study.  
 Degree centrality measures the connectedness of members of the social network. 
It shows who is the most connected, central, or “hub” of the social network. It is 
analogous to a bicycle wheel (Scott, 2012). This measure resulted in showing who the 
most central actor in the network is, and which actor maintains the most ties with other 
actors. Originally, I intended to also use this measure to study any type of power dynamic 
that might have existed within the network. However, given the lack of strong 
cooperative networks that emerged, I was unable to use this measure as originally 
intended.  
 
Validation Strategies 
 To ensure data validity in the qualitative research portion, I utilized three 
approaches. First, methodological triangulation was used. Methodological triangulation, 
or “mixed methods,” allowed me to explore the existence of current social networks 
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among NGOs in Haiti by drawing upon various data sources. Triangulation in this sense 
consists of using more than one type of method to study a phenomenon (Bekhet & 
Zauszniewski, 2012). In this particular study, methodological triangulation consisted of 
analyzing the data both by thematic analysis and by social network analysis. 
Triangulation allows the opportunity to compare findings for either convergence or 
divergence (Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012; Casey & Murphy, 2009). It is useful for 
research validity because it confirms findings, provides a more comprehensive set(s) of 
data, and enhances the understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Bekhet & 
Zauszniewski, 2012).  Triangulation has been noted to have some limitations, but there 
are various ways in which to overcome these issues. The use of a well-focused and clear 
research question is imperative, as is the rationale for using triangulation (Casey & 
Murphy, 2009). In this particular study, triangulation allowed me to confirm various 
aspects of my data. For example, from my interview data, I gathered from participants 
that there were generally low levels of cooperation in Haiti. The social network analysis 
confirmed this finding. The social network analysis also provided the opportunity to 
visualize the data that was given in personal interviews, and the measures used in the 
SNA provided quantitative results to complement the qualitative results. 
 I also used the qualitative research analysis method of “member checks” as an 
additional measure of validity. Member checks, or respondent validation, ensure that 
researchers are correctly analyzing the data; they confirm that researcher understandings 
align with participant intentions (Sandelowski, 2008). Member checks ask participants to 
give feedback and evaluate whether researchers accurately described the experiences that 
the participant discussed; this is known as descriptive validity (Sandelowski, 2008). 
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Member checks were appropriate for this particular study specifically because I did not 
attempt to discern any type of hidden meaning in the data; therefore, it actually behooved 
me to use member checks. Member checks in this manner are important in qualitative 
research, as they provide a certain “quality control” by decreasing the incidence of 
incorrect data and help to ensure that the overall findings are authentic (Harper & Cole, 
2012). As I gathered qualitative data on what does or does not occur regarding 
cooperation between NGOs, the participant him/herself was in the best position to 
validate the data that was given. The use of member checks gives the participant the 
opportunity to correct and/or clarify any data that is given, which assists in ensuring data 
validity. 
 Formal member checks were conducted with two key informants. I provided the 
key informants with a summary of the main themes that emerged from our conversation. 
I also gave the informants the option to review the transcript if desired; I did this in order 
to give participants a choice—dubbed “participatory member checking,” (Doyle, 2007, p. 
908), it offers participants an opportunity to choose how they will validate their own 
words. Member checking was important in this research because one of the key 
informants was able to explain her interpretation of one of my findings a bit further to 
add clarity. For example, one of my first main summary points in the first member check 
was  
 “Overall, there are many NGOs in Haiti, some registered and non-registered. 
 While there are advantages to being non-registered, one of the significant 
 disadvantages is that there is no sense of community.” 
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The participant clarified that while there was lack of community among all NGOs, both 
registered and non-registered, being unregistered meant that people were not accountable 
to country leaders or others in the same field of work, which led to isolation and no sense 
of community. 
 Finally, I utilized inter-coder agreement for the coding validity of my qualitative 
data. The type of inter-coder agreement method that was used was the "percent 
agreement" method. Percent agreement is calculated by dividing total number of times 
analysts' coding is in agreement by the total number of code comparisons" (Guest, 
MacQueen & Namey, 2012, p. 89). An agreement of 80% or more is considered to be a 
"good" rating (Guest, MacQueen & Namey, 2012). In this particular research, the percent 
agreement score was 77% for the first transcript and 75% for the second transcript. 
Although this was not 80%, it is still in the acceptable range.   
 In summary, data collection methods included website organizational information 
gathering and semi-structured interviews. This mixed-methods approach allowed for data 
triangulation, whereby results and conclusions could be verified. The interview data was 
analyzed using both thematic analysis and social network analysis. The following 
chapters will detail the results of the thematic analysis (Chapter 3) and the social network 
analysis (Chapter 4). The concluding chapter will discuss how the overall findings can be 
used to inform policy and to encourage collective action. 
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  CHAPTER 3 
THEMATIC ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
 The results of the thematic analysis yielded four overarching themes: Cooperation 
is Beneficial, Barriers, Consequences, and Cooperation is Needed. Each overarching 
theme also had various subthemes. The results are organized by first discussing that 
cooperation was overwhelmingly found to be beneficial and participants identified 
several reasons why this was so. Second, while participants described the overwhelming 
benefits that cooperation afforded, they also recognized the barriers that hindered 
effective cooperation. Third, even though participants did identify multiple barriers, there 
were often consequences to not cooperating, both actual and implied. Finally, participants 
recognized the overwhelming need to cooperate in Haiti.  
 
1. Cooperation is Beneficial 
 Overwhelmingly, participants described cooperation as extremely beneficial to 
not just the individual organizations, but to patients and the overall population. Thirteen 
participants (76%) stated that their organizations currently engaged in cooperative efforts 
with other organizations that were also working in some aspect of maternal and child 
health. Between these 13 participants, there were a total of 56 identified cooperative 
relationships with and between organizations. These cooperative relationships show up in 
the social network analysis, but the networks are generally separate and distinct; i.e., 
many of them are silo-like in nature. Of these 56 cooperative relationships, participants 
described 51 of them as "beneficial." Four sub-themes emerged in this category. 
Participants described cooperation as beneficial for four main reasons: the opportunity to 
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share information and resources, learning from other organizations, providing 
better patient care, and maximizing efficiency. Many participants could give specific 
examples of when cooperative efforts resulted in these beneficial outcomes. 
 
1.1 Share information and resources 
 The opportunity to share information and resources was commonly cited as a 
benefit of cooperation. Of the 56 identified cooperative relationships, 45 of these 
relationships shared information and 33 of these relationships shared resources and 
materials. More than one participant stated that the collaborative relationships that shared 
information and resources resulted in reducing resource inefficiencies and also provided 
fewer instances where services might be duplicated. When asked specifically if the 
various partnerships and collaborative efforts were beneficial, eight participants provided 
examples where sharing information and/or resources had benefitted either the 
organization or the organization's mission: 
 "The biggest benefit with [Organization X] is that they have so many more 
 resources...They ...give a lot of supplies. There's never enough. There's never 
 enough gloves, I mean midwives are doing deliveries without gloves sometimes. 
 But I would say that without their presence and resources...it would be really, 
 really difficult for us to stay. So they are throwing money at us and we are glad 
 they are."  
 
Multiple participants reported having the opportunity to collaborate on various occasions, 
usually through attending an inter-agency meeting or forum, and most participants found 
those efforts beneficial. However, not all participants found collaboration opportunities 
beneficial, as either things were not accomplished or "collaboration" actually 
masqueraded as something else: 
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 "Usually [when people approach me for a collaboration opportunity], they're 
 looking for resources, not collaboration. Not like you're going to share 
 something. They look for resources from me. But every little NGO is struggling 
 for resources so you really can't do that."  
 
 While overall cooperation opportunities were seen as beneficial, it was noted that 
not all opportunities produced fruitful outcomes. Overall, however, sharing information 
and resources benefitted organizational missions, patients and communities at large. 
 
1.2 Learning from other organizations 
 Participants also cited the opportunity to learn from other organizations as an 
important benefit of cooperation. Six of the thirteen participants (46%) that have 
established partnerships cited learning from other organizations as a specific benefit of 
cooperation. These participants often cited the "expertise" of other organizations as a 
benefit that helped them to improve their own organizational programs: 
 "I would say [it has been beneficial] because they have more expertise than we do 
 and they have more experience. They are aware of other resources like a 
 maternity hospital that is available for emergency maternity care. They have 
 helped us delineate what is an emergency and what's not on a couple of 
 occasions." 
 
 As one participated stated, cooperating and learning from other organizations 
allows the opportunity to not "reinvent the wheel" which ultimately maximizes 
efficiency. 
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1.3 Providing better patient care 
 Cooperation also enabled participants to provide better patient care. Often, 
participants cited that this was the case because organizations with which there were 
established partnerships could provide complementary services or provide services that 
some organizations could not. Eight participants (50%) cited providing better patient care 
as a benefit of cooperation. Four of the 13 participants who have established partnerships 
(31%) could give specific instances where collaborating had resulted in providing better 
patient care. One participant, whose organization runs a primary care clinic, shared a 
story about the high prevalence of malnutrition in the catchment area. Knowing that the 
clinic itself could not provide the needed services to address the malnutrition, she and 
other staff members partnered with an organization whose sole mission was to address 
malnutrition. Of the outcome, she stated: 
 "[It was] absolutely [beneficial]...We needed to do something immediately...The 
 program was already in place...they have been wonderful." 
 
 Clinics in Haiti, particularly primary care clinics, cannot always provide the level 
of services that some of the more acutely sick people need. Partnerships have allowed 
multiple participant organizations to expand the level of care that patients need and 
adequately address various medical issues. 
 
1.4 Maximizing efficiency 
 Seven participants (41%) identified maximizing efficiency as a benefit to 
cooperation. Cooperation provided the opportunity to build capacity and provide services 
to the population while minimizing waste. One organization was able to rapidly scale up 
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after the 2010 earthquake as a result of partnering with an organization that was already 
present in the community and had deep knowledge of the area and local population: 
 
 "...right after the earthquake, we were able to scale up our emergency response 
 much more quickly than we would have been able to had we not partnered with 
 [Organization  Y], due to the large network of community health workers that they 
 work with." 
 
 Participants also discussed how operations and programs were able to expand due 
to existing relationships that partners had. Having partners that had established 
relationships in place allowed for a better opportunity to expand program services: 
 "They had a presence in the community so it was a good way to branch out 
 through that network." 
 
 Finally, overall capacity building was another specific example given in how 
partnering can maximize efficiency: 
 "Not to mention the capacity building. To come and train up nurses and to train 
 our community health workers on deworming, immunizations, iron deficiency 
 anemia, malnutrition." 
 
 Overall, participants felt that without some of the partnerships that they had built 
and established, that organizational programs and outcomes would not be as strong nor as 
effective as they are currently. Even though there were multiple benefits that resulted 
from cooperation, participants did recognize that substantial barriers existed that hindered 
cooperation from occurring.  
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2. Barriers 
 "Barriers" was a common theme throughout the project. The difficulty inherent in 
collective action was expressed through mention of barriers, both explicitly identified 
and told through personal stories of failed cooperation or opportunities to cooperate that 
ultimately did not occur. 
 Participants stated that they thought cooperation was difficult, mainly in part due 
to the many barriers that existed. Interviewees identified many barriers to cooperation 
that hindered effective collective action, which constituted several subthemes: 
competition, egos, infrastructure, time, rogue groups and lack of resources. The results 
from each identified subtheme is discussed below. 
 From a review of the literature, it was believed that competition would be a 
significant identified barrier for effective cooperation, as this has been identified as a 
barrier to effective cooperation among NGOs. Therefore, several questions were designed 
to elicit this potential theme. While one question specifically asked about barriers, where 
participants were given the opportunity to identify competition as a barrier, another 
question asked specifically, "Do you feel that an environment of competition between 
NGOs in Haiti?" If the answer was affirmative, participants then were asked to give more 
detail and to identify specific areas in which organizations compete (services, funding, 
results/achievements). Further, participants were also asked to outline in detail specific 
times when cooperation may have been beneficial but did not occur, as well as specific 
instances where cooperation was the intention but it failed. This was an opportunity for 
participants to exemplify, with anecdotes, specific barriers that were identified to 
effective cooperation. 
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2.1 Competition 
 When specifically asked about barriers to cooperation, competition was the most 
common barrier identified. A total of 11 out of 17 (65%) participants identified 
competition as a major barrier to cooperation. NGOs compete for funding, particularly as 
it has become much more scarce after a spike in available funding following the 2010 
earthquake in the Port au Prince area. Several participants mentioned the desire for NGOs 
to receive "full credit" for projects and success stories, particularly because this could 
result in increased funding. The very nature of the funding environment renders it 
competitive (i.e., if one organization receives funding, that is at the expense of other 
organizations not receiving that same potential funding). The threat of losing funding was 
a common theme throughout participant narratives that discussed competition. As one 
participant stated: 
 "With NGOs, everybody is vying for the same dollar. We are all trying to raise 
 money for our interests, so to speak. I think people get really possessive when it 
 comes to partnerships and money and that hinders working together." 
 
 Competition was expressed in personal stories of failed cooperation efforts:  
 "...we had the issue of them coming in wanting to do their part in the community 
 and ignoring that another NGO had been working there, instead of coming and 
 asking how they could partner. You see this a lot in Haiti...they are competing for 
 territory because the territory means more population served and eventually more 
 funding." 
 
 The theme of competition was not surprising, as this has been identified in 
previous literature as a common issue in the NGO environment. Participants repeatedly 
mentioned competition throughout the interview, and when they were specifically asked 
if they believed there was an environment of competition among NGOs in Haiti, 15 of 17 
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participants believed that there was competition among NGOs. Given how important 
competition was a barrier was, participants also mentioned "egos" being a barrier, as egos 
often accompany a competitive nature. 
 
2.1.1 Egos 
 One way in which competition was commonly expressed was mention of egos. 
Egos were often identified in tandem with competition. Six of the 11 participants who 
identified competition as a barrier also stated egos were a barrier. Participants described 
other organizations as both lacking flexibility and the desire to learn from others who 
might be approaching issues in a different, or sometimes better, manner: 
 "I think peoples' egos is a barrier...People just think they know what is best and 
 they don't need help, they are doing the best in Haiti, they are the only ones." 
 
  Some participants believe that many NGOs think they "know what is best" and 
this can impede effective cooperation. One interviewee discussed a personal story of 
failed cooperation that resulted from this belief: 
 "When we do the joint training with the other organization, there was a third 
 organization involved in it initially and we had wanted to do a three-way joint 
 training but the third organization was adamant about doing it one way and the 
 other two of us didn't feel that it was appropriate." 
	
 Participants generally believed that NGO ownership for projects, results and 
accompanying successes impeded cooperation, and that egos kept organizations from 
effectively working together.  
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2.2 Infrastructure issues 
 Infrastructure issues was another barrier that was commonly mentioned. Eight of 
17 participants (47%) cited infrastructure as a barrier to cooperation. The infrastructure 
environment in Haiti is often challenging, with poor roads, inadequate transportation, 
communication issues, and distance identified as specific infrastructural issues that 
impede effective cooperation. Electricity is often intermittent, and cell phone service can 
often be unreliable, particularly in the rural areas. Roads can be rough and unpaved, and 
can easily wash out when heavy rains occur, which further impedes travel. As one 
participant stated: 
 "...collaborating is so difficult because of the roads. Because of the electricity, it 
 isn't always good so you don't always have phones...transportation is an issue...a 
 lot of infrastructure issues." 
 
 One participant specifically stated that distance was the reason why a particular 
cooperative effort with another organization had not been a beneficial endeavor: 
 "With this particular organization, I think it's just because...the distance is far. It's 
 further than the other places." 
 
 These infrastructural issues can render collaboration difficult, as a simple phone 
call or attending a forum or meeting can often be infeasible, thus adding additional layers 
to the inherent difficulties that already exist in effective cooperation.  
  
2.3 Lack of time 
 Lack of time was yet another barrier that was identified by multiple participants 
(six out of 17, or 35%) as a barrier that hinders cooperation. Many NGOs are under-
	 75 
resourced, particularly smaller NGOs, and finding adequate time to network and meet 
with others can be difficult: 
 "It takes a lot of time to sit down with these organizations and then they have to 
 go back to their board and pass through these other people...everyone is 
 overworked."  
 
 This sense of lack of time was mentioned multiple times in various interviews as 
to why cooperation between NGOs did not occur more often.  
 
2.4 Lack of resources  
 Lack of resources also was commonly expressed by participants (six out of 17, or 
35%). As mentioned above, many NGOs in Haiti have difficulty in obtaining the 
necessary resources to fully accomplish their missions: 
 
 "We have been painted this picture that there are billions of dollars being poured 
 into the charitable sector in Haiti...but...that still misses the point that despite all 
 those NGOs and all those resources...there are still huge unmet needs. So when 
 you want more resources and the other organization that you collaborate with is 
 also under-resourced...it's hard to again see a value in getting yourselves 
 together because it's just an underequipped sector." 
 
 One story of failed cooperation exemplified how lack of resources was an 
impediment to successful cooperation: 
 "We had several cooperative efforts...that have fallen through. For a period of 
 time we stopped delivering babies [at our facility] because there was a new 
 delivery ward that was donated and built after the earthquake. It was a beautiful 
 building but they didn't have the staff and the midwives to operate it. So we 
 supplied the midwives which meant  we couldn't then do deliveries but we 
 thought we would combine forces. We moved our staff over there and closed our 
 doors for deliveries. It just didn't work out...[we lack] the resources it takes to 
 make something happen. Oftentimes we think narrowly about a problem. It 
 takes something very broad to keep it going. You might buy an ambulance for 
 somebody and you're going to share the ambulance but can you keep the 
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 ambulance going, do you have all the spare parts, the mechanic and everything 
 else it's going to take  for long range planning." 
 
 Lack of financial capital and lack of human capital were common reasons 
identified by participants as barriers to effective cooperation.  
 
2.5 Rogue Groups 
 The idea of rogue groups was expressed by six participants (35%). Rogue groups 
refer to people or organizations who come to Haiti to deliver care, but do so without 
consulting local population needs or desires. As one participant stated: 
 
 "I also personally feel that the proximity to the U.S. and the decades of 
 "missionary" groups has exponentially increased the number of organizations 
 "doing their own thing"--not really taking into consideration the needs or desires 
 of the communities where they work." 
 
 Participants described rogue groups with terms like "renegade," "do it yourself" 
and "single mindedness." Participants discussed how rogue groups have a mindset that 
they must be some of the first people who are addressing the issue or issues in Haiti, and 
a false sense of knowing what is best for approaching a particular problem. One 
participant shared his thoughts on groups who continue to visit Haiti without having done 
any research into the local community needs: 
 "...you ride on an airplane and it seems like you meet people at the airport who 
 are going to Haiti for a second or third time and they're going down to tackle this 
 problem, build a school, start a clinic. You don't have to ask very many questions 
 about what foundational research have they done. Have they done house to house 
 surveys to find out where people are going to get their vaccinations? Or going to 
 deliver their babies? People aren't really doing the work ahead of time to know 
 what the need is. They go in and do it in a silo." 
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 Participants felt that this "do it yourself" spirit does not lend itself to effective 
cooperation, particularly as there is a lack of organization, and, as one participant stated, 
"dysfunction." 
 Even though substantial barriers exist that make cooperation difficult, participants 
did acknowledge that lack of cooperation has consequences.  
3. CONSEQUENCES 
 As is consistent with the literature, there are common consequences to not 
cooperating: duplication of services, fragmentation, incomplete information, and resource 
misallocation. Many participants could identify personal stories that exhibited each of 
these consequences, illustrating that not only are these "perceived" issues, they also occur 
in reality. 
 
3.1 Duplication of services 
 A total of twelve (70%) participants told personal stories of duplication of 
services that occurred. This commonly occurs in Haiti, due to multiple reasons, but one 
dominant reason is that with the Haitian population, people will often go to where care is 
free, even if it is duplicated care. This can be problematic, particularly when there are 
visiting medical mission teams that visit the areas where some of these NGOs are located: 
 "...you have this patient who has been your patient for a while, but then they are 
 going to this mobile clinic and they are telling the foreigners that they have 
 hypertension. They are already getting the medicine from us and then they got 
 medication from this other team too. So you don't know how the medications will 
 interact and what they will do. You are duplicating services but you are also 
 putting the patients at risk." 
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 Lack of adequate record keeping in Haiti means that there will often be patients 
who visit multiple places, but there is no information on what services were received: 
 "Mothers will come to [us] and they will have had three or four prenatal visits at 
 three or four different sites. And they may have had two or three clinic visits 
 because they felt ill and went in to see a doctor here or there." 
 
 One participant did discuss how cooperating resulted in two organizations not 
duplicating services, as they were able to meet and discuss which services each would 
offer to have maximum population health impact: 
 "...[they were] gung-ho about providing every service...that you could imagine. 
 Pediatrics, geriatrics, surgery, etc. They asked us for help and we said you're 
 actually going to be duplicating some of our services, which is not fruitful and we 
 will suffer financial strain very quickly. Why don't you concentrate on one thing 
 and do that one thing well, which is pediatrics...they said that sounds like a great 
 idea. They kept their end of the bargain and they added some additional services 
 that we don't have, like dentistry." 
 
Clearly, this is an example of how effective cooperation can positively impact the 
community and overall population health.  
 
3.2 Fragmentation 
 A total of eleven participants (65%) had experiences with fragmentation 
occurring, particularly in the areas of service delivery and care. The definition of being 
fragmented is "existing or functioning as though broken into separate parts; disorganized" 
(Oxford Dictionary, n.d.) Fragmentation in health care refers to services that are not 
cohesive; they might occur separately and service providers therefore see only parts 
without being able to piece those parts into the overall "whole" health picture (Stange, 
2009). Similar to one of the main issues involved with "duplication of services," Haitians 
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will often go from provider to provider for services; while there may not necessarily be 
duplication of services, the lack of understanding the patient's medical history and 
provider visit history can be problematic, particularly when working with a population 
that is overwhelmingly uneducated. The lack of cooperation means there is no clear 
history of services, and the "whole" health picture cannot be obtained. One participant 
stated: 
 "...they have scraps of paper from each of these different places that are 
 incomplete and often they're not very authentic. It looks like it was scratched on a 
 piece of paper. It doesn't look like a medical record. You don't know the quality of 
 care they've had, you  don't know their background, and no they're coming to 
 deliver a baby. So you really have a poor fragmented history." 
 
 Fragmentation also occurs within the entire spectrum of NGO health services, not 
just maternal health. One participant described the lack of an understanding of 
"comprehensive care" in the Haitian population, as well as a lack of comprehensive care 
services that are available in the country: 
 "...especially in maternal health. There were pieces of it being done in different 
 places on the island but the women had no idea where they went...They know 
 what a c-section costs and where to get an ultrasound but there was no 
 comprehensive care notion in their minds. So fragmentation from that standpoint-
 -a fragmentation of service delivery and education." 
 
  Another participant described the lack of coverage in certain areas of the country 
that may be more difficult to work in effectively.  
 "Organizations...come to the same spots and leave other spots uncovered. The 
 consequence is lack of coverage...NGOs have an affinity for some areas. Some 
 areas are easier to work in than others. The most challenging areas, people don't 
 go there." 
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 Yet a third participant described the lack of communication between 
organizations resulting in fragmented care: 
 "...if I need to refer a patient who has a problem with their eye, I need to send 
 them to an eye clinic. But I can't get ahold of someone in the eye clinic, and all I 
 have is an address, and there is no other contact information. I try to send the 
 patient and I'm trying to cooperate with that clinic but that patient goes and it's 
 not a day they work. Or they need to call first...They travelled two hours...but 
 because there wasn't good communication between the two institutions, the 
 patient isn't getting the care when they need to get it." 
 
 Fragmentation clearly can negatively impact patient care and health outcomes. 
 
3.3 Incomplete Information 
 A total of eight participants (47%) could identify instances where incomplete 
information resulted from lack of cooperation. This often accompanies "duplication of 
services." Often, patients will come to an organization's clinic and those patients have 
been seen elsewhere, but there is no or incomplete information on what services were 
provided, what prescription drugs may have been given, or what a diagnoses may have 
been. Sometimes, this incomplete information can be fatal, as was evidenced in one 
participant's story: 
 "...an 18-month old child...had been taken to a hospital...which is known for pretty 
 darn poor care...[the parents and child] left against medical advice...I looked at 
 the child, listened to his chest and said 'This child has pneumonia, let's start him 
 on an antibiotic'...I left the country on Friday and before I got home, the child 
 died...I wrote the ED of the organization funding the hospital...supposedly there is 
 more to the story than we were told...the kid was given an IV, put on antibiotics, 
 given oxygen...We have all this miscommunication, who knows whatever really 
 happened to this poor family...I'm not even convinced the kid was 18 months 
 old...Did I misdiagnose because I was told he was 18 months and he was only 
 eight months? There is a big difference between a child who is eight months and 
 18 months and how that child can handle pneumonia." 
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 Incomplete information can also affect the quality of care that patients receive, 
particularly if there is a need to coordinate specialty services during a time period that a 
surgical team might be visiting. One participant told a story of incomplete information 
resulting in ten patients not receiving surgery when a team was visiting. Overall, 
participants agreed that incomplete information was an issue related to both lack of 
cooperation and low health literacy among the Haitian population. 
 
3.4 Resource Misallocation 
 Seven participants (41%) could identify instances where resource misallocation 
(where resources are being used or distributed in ways that are not optimal) occurred. 
Most often, this was seen in how resources were not evenly distributed and therefore 
could not be used before an expiration date, as was the case in an instance where a large 
shipment of vitamins was received. The donor could use some of the resources, but not 
all: 
 "Resource misallocation. We are guilty of this ourselves. I was in Haiti last year 
 and a truck pulls up and they were unloading boxes for like two hours. This was a 
 fairly small building, what's in all those boxes? They were vitamins. Some 
 organizations wanted to donate vitamins and they sent a whole truck full. These 
 things are going to expire. Then we had to figure out what other healthcare 
 programs we could give them to." 
 
 Another participant stated that without cooperation, often times resources can go 
to waste: 
 "With medications, they might expire. When you have excess supply of medicine, 
 they would be wasted if you do not have collaboration with other organizations 
 that could utilize them." 
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 Similarly echoed by another participant: 
 "Resource allocation is always an issue when you get a call from an organization 
 and they'll say, 'I've got XY and Z' and they didn't realize it but they just reached 
 their expiration date, could you use this stuff? And it's like, um, you could have 
 called me three months ago. Allocation of resources is always important." 
 
 Lack of cooperation can contribute to resource misallocation, because, as one 
participant mentioned, not having established cooperative relationships with other 
organizations can result in waste when one might otherwise be able to donate resources 
that cannot be effectively used.  
 
4. NEED TO COOPERATE 
 Overwhelmingly, participants agreed that there is a strong need for NGOs to 
cooperate in Haiti. When asked if cooperation should be required by donor agencies as a 
condition of receiving funding, 14 of 17 participants (82%) stated "yes." However, most 
of these participants did stipulate that it would depend on the situation and what type of 
collaboration was required:  
 "It would depend on the situation. I think there are situations where it would be 
 beneficial, but there are other situations where it would not be beneficial or 
 appropriate. If you mandated that I meet with people who work in Cap Haitien 
 once a week [from Port au Prince], I would laugh at them and say keep your 
 money because I can't do it." 
 
 Similarly, when asked if cooperation should be required by the Haitian 
government, 14 of 17 participants (82%) agreed that it should be required by the 
government. Most participants felt that the government did not do enough to regulate 
NGOs and that the government should put more effort into doing so. However, it was 
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acknowledged that the capacity of the government to do so was minimal, as the 
government currently has very weak enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, the 
seriousness with which it would be perceived was questionable: 
 "With all due respect, I think a lot of people would consider it a bit of a joke 
 because of the reputation that the Haitian government has for doing things more 
 poorly than a lot of the private sector, the NGOs. This leads to other 
 organizations not wanting them involved. They feel that working with the Haitian 
 government slows the process down without benefitting it. So I think that there 
 wouldn't be initially a lot of respect for it and yet I don't know if it's a bad idea 
 because ultimately to see a stronger Haiti you need a stronger Haitian 
 government who is going to be active in improving the health and social service 
 sector." 
 
 It was brought to my attention that there is, indeed, a governmental coordinating 
body in Haiti whose sole purpose is to coordinate the work of NGOs. L'Unité de 
Coordination des Activités des ONG (UCAONG), or the NGO Activity Coordination 
Unit, is responsible to "...guide, approve, coordinate, promote, supervise and monitor 
NGO initiatives across the country" (Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération 
Externe, 2014). However, it must be noted that this unit is only responsible for 
supervising and coordinating those NGOs in the country that are registered with the 
government. Haiti has thousands of NGOs (it is estimated that the country has 10,000) 
but not all are registered with the government. The latest list of registered NGOs that was 
able to be found was from 2012, and that list named only 461 NGOs that were officially 
registered with the government (Haitian Resource Development Foundation, 2012). Of 
the participants that were interviewed for this research, only two organizations were 
currently registered with the government. One of these participants shared that upon 
becoming officially registered with the Haitian government, his organization received an 
email from UCAONG inviting two representatives to give a presentation at their 
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government office, but that there had been no formal interaction with UCAONG since 
that time several years ago. The other participant whose organization was registered 
shared her frustrations of working with the unit: 
 "You have to have an accountant that is affiliated with the DF and those 
 accountants ask for a standard 10 to 20 percent [of our annual budget]. So now 
 we are like what is the point of getting NGO status. It doesn't even make you tax 
 exempt and it just makes you more known so that they can get money from you." 
 
 Only three participants had actually heard of UCAONG. Registering with the 
government is seen as a cumbersome process, it is often confusing, and clearly there was 
not a full understanding of what agencies were involved with NGO coordination and 
oversight. All participants were aware of the need to register with the Haitian 
government, but very few had actually heard of UCAONG. Though almost all 
participants who were not registered with the government stated that they were currently 
in the process of becoming registered, the general sentiment was that becoming registered 
with the government was difficult, costly and did not particularly bring any additional 
benefits: 
 "They collect a lot of taxes and fees, but don't offer much guidance and 
 coordination. When I first heard about them, I thought they were going to better 
 monitor NGOs and help them be compliant. They were also supposed to 
 coordinate those in like fields (medical, education, orphan care, etc). They might 
 be doing it some, but not much and  not enough for it to have any effect or 
 second thought from a foreigner." 
 
 The overall consensus from participants was that there is a strong need for 
cooperation in Haiti, but that the current mechanisms that encourage cooperation did not 
have much effect on the level of cooperation that is taking place. This was evident, since 
most participants were not even aware of UCAONG. 
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 Finally, all 17 participants believed that there should be a coordinating 
mechanism through which all NGOs can share information. The general consensus was 
that this could best be done through an online forum, where information can be shared 
and ideas solicited. 
 
5. EARTHQUAKE AS A RELATIONSHIP MARKER 
 Another theme that emerged during coding was the demarcation of what Haiti 
NGO activity was like "before the earthquake" and "after the earthquake." Haiti 
experienced a devastating earthquake in January 2010 that killed over 200,000 people 
and displaced millions. Four participants classified NGO activity in terms of "before the 
earthquake" and "after the earthquake." This was a clear marker in time of what NGO 
activity looked like in Haiti.  
 Even though one of the protocol questions asked about cooperation during the 
earthquake, the clear demarcation of "before" and "after" the earthquake appeared in 
various reference forms throughout the interviews. NGO activity before the earthquake 
was seen as "good" activity, as many of the NGOs had been operating for a significant 
period of time, were familiar with the country, and could work effectively. As one 
participant described: 
 "The earthquake was a huge factor...the number of NGOs here, the number of 
 foreigners here, the type of foreigners here. Everything changed after the 
 earthquake. We have been here since 1994. We had many years to know what it 
 was like. The earthquake was the turning point that flipped all of NGO Haiti..." 
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 The earthquake was a marker of an influx of NGOs that, while initially helpful in 
terms of disaster relief, have not been effective in the long run. As one participant stated: 
 "It was this huge influx of NGOs and everybody was doing their own thing [when 
 the earthquake occurred]. It was good up front because we needed all the help we 
 could get as far as emergency disaster relief...[but] they stayed too long and 
 didn't have a good exit strategy for Haiti. They disrupted the long term medical 
 care...sometimes people stay longer than they need to and they disrupt the 
 system." 
 
 There were attempts at cooperating, as the World Health Organization would hold 
cluster meetings (where NGOs working in particular sectors would come together to 
share information), and while they may have been somewhat helpful at the time, the 
cluster meetings have continued without significant results. Trying to continue the cluster 
meetings indefinitely did not necessarily yield fruitful results:  
 "There is a Ministry of Health nutrition cluster meeting. It's in Port au Prince 
 every month and it's all the nutrition partners from around the country...everyone 
 just basically goes around and reads off numbers and no one listens. Everyone 
 presents data that is not correct...Nothing really gets accomplished there." 
 
 The earthquake was also seen as a turning point in how organizations interacted 
with each other. Some participants did not feel that there was much competition until the 
earthquake occurred. As one participant stated: 
 "After the earthquake, people really came together a lot better because everyone 
 was massively stressed and it was horrible. Everyone cooperated a lot more and 
 then when the sun started going down then everyone starts bickering more. It's 
 more of a competition because they are competing for funds because funds are so 
 low." 
 
 Another participant echoed the belief that the "after the earthquake" environment 
resulted in more competition: 
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 "There was a huge influx of money coming into Haiti after the earthquake. They 
 were practically handing it out like candy. NGOs got used to this, and over the 
 last two years, the funding has drastically dropped off as Haiti is no longer on the 
 "emergency/disaster" global radar...this drop in available funding has caused a 
 respective increase in competition of organizations--holding onto their ideas, 
 approaches to remain "innovative." So ultimately, they want to hang onto their 
 successful ideas which could benefit so many people [and these ideas] are not 
 shared with other organizations." 
 
 The earthquake had an effect on not only NGO activity, but in many ways, 
increased competition among NGOs. Competition was identified as a main barrier to 
effective cooperation, and the earthquake exacerbated this barrier. 
 This portion of the research (semi-structured interviews and ensuing thematic 
analysis) produced valuable information that was helpful in understanding how 
participants talked about, perceived and described cooperation between NGOs. This is 
important information to know, as analyzing how participants talk about collective action 
in the provision of public goods (health) can help to foster a greater understanding of how 
collective action is occurring, barriers to effective collective action, and examples of 
successful collective action; all of these, in turn, inform future strategies for improving 
collective action.  
Limitations 
 While the thematic analysis on the qualitative interview data was indeed valuable 
in terms of yielding important information, it should be noted that there was a significant 
limitation: the qualitative data in this particular research did not allow for networks to be 
visualized. In other words, I could understand how participants perceived and talked 
about collective action, but I could not gain a solid understanding of what particular 
collective action networks (if there were any) existed. For this reason, I conducted a 
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social network analysis, so that I could visualize and quantify potential existing networks. 
This social network analysis is detailed in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: KUMBAYA AROUND THE CAMPFIRE OR 
WORKING IN SILOS? 
 
 Chapter 3 presented the results of the thematic analysis. This chapter presents the 
results of the social network analysis. First, however, it is useful to briefly discuss the 
levels of cooperation that were assessed and how they were operationalized. Koch (2011) 
operationalized cooperation at three levels, with Level I being the lowest level and 
accruing the least number of benefits for the collective group but high individual benefits 
for the NGO, and Level III resulting in high benefits for the overall group but low 
benefits for individual NGOs. In line with my hypothesis that low levels of cooperation 
were occurring among NGOs, it was inappropriate to apply Koch's levels of cooperation, 
as Koch operationalized the lowest level of cooperation as consisting of a joint effort. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, levels of cooperation were broken down into 
three main categories: 
• Type I: Share Information (Coordination) 
• Type II: Share Resources/Materials 
• Type III: Participate in a Joint Effort 
 Type I was actually classified as typical “coordination,” as information sharing 
essentially seeks to coordinate efforts based on available data.  
As described in the Methodology chapter, in order to conduct the social network 
analysis, participants were asked to characterize their cooperative relationships with other 
organizational actors. As listed above, cooperative categories were as follows: share 
information, share resources and/or materials, participate in a joint effort, refer patients, 
or other. Recall that the "refer patients" category arose during the interview process as 
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one that should be included, as many organizations engaged in this type of relationship, 
although this relationship was not always reciprocal.  
 Participants could also choose "Other" if cooperation efforts did not fit any of the 
above categories. Each ascending type of cooperation resulted in a higher degree of 
cooperation; i.e., "Share information" was theorized to be the level of cooperation that 
required the least effort, while "Participate in a joint effort" was theorized to require the 
highest level of effort. A fourth category that emerged during the study, though it was not 
categorized into a level, was "refer patients." 
 The information collected in this stage allowed for the creation of matrices that 
were then used to calculate several social network analysis measures: degree centrality, 
reach and density. All of these calculations provide insight into the networks and their 
interconnectedness. 
 In the following section, I will discuss the results of the social network analysis 
calculations. 
 
Degree Centrality 
 The measure of degree centrality is an important measure because it shows the 
relative advantaged position that some actors may have in relationship to others. Actors 
that have many ties may have access to and be able to cull more resources from the entire 
network as a whole. It is important, however, to distinguish between an actor's "in 
degree" and "out degree" centrality measure. An actor who receives many ties, or has a 
high "in degree" score, can be viewed as prominent in the network or be an actor with 
high prestige. In other words, this actor may be seen as one who is very important in the 
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network, as the high number of received ties indicates that many other actors may seek 
out that particular actor. In contrast, actors with a high number of "out degree" ties 
indicates that actor is able to exchange with many other actors, or might be able to 
impress his or her views on many others. These types of actors are said to be influential 
actors (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
 Central actors have the most ties to other actors in the network. In a simple 
network graph that resembles a circle, all actors have one tie to another actor, as each 
actor is perfectly situation around the entire circle.  Because each actor is positioned 
around the circle with no more than one tie to another actor, no actor is the most central 
in the network. In this type of network, all actors would have low degree centrality. In a 
simple network graph that resembles a star, one actor will have ties to all other actors, 
and these other actors will only have one tie to the central actor (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). In this type of network, one actor is considered central (and therefore would have 
high degree centrality) and the other actors are not considered central (and therefore 
would have low degree centrality). 
 Degree centrality was calculated in UCINET for each level of cooperation: 
Sharing information, Sharing resources/materials, Joint effort, and Referring patients. 
Only those actors with number of in-ties and/or out-ties of one or greater are included in 
the table. This is because of the entire network that was developed, many actors had no 
in-ties or out-ties (as they were only identified and not interviewed), and therefore these 
isolates could not be fully incorporated into the analysis. It is important to note here that 
my research is biased towards those who are actually cooperating; many organizations 
identified may not be actually cooperating with others, and while they may be interesting 
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and noteworthy as social isolates, for purposes of this study, they were not included. My 
social network analysis findings are conservative findings, because I am only including 
those organizations that report cooperating with others. Further, as I was unable to 
conduct a whole social network analysis due to limited participants, results should be 
interpreted as exploratory. 
 Actors who reported sharing information "Sharing information", (Table 5-1), 
which correlated to Type I cooperation, had 42 total out-ties and 41 total in-ties. Figure 5-
1 displays the UCINET NetDraw visualization of the network for actors who report 
sharing information. 
 Actors who report sharing resources (Table 5-2) had 32 out-ties and 32 in-ties. 
Sharing resources, which was categorized to correlate to Type II cooperation, exhibited a 
similar pattern as sharing information (Type I), which showed rather dispersed networks 
(Figure 5-2), with one network exhibiting a perfect "star" design (where one central actor 
has ties to all other actors). However, Type II cooperation (sharing resources) had fewer 
ties than Type I cooperation (sharing information), which was expected given that Type 
II indicates a higher degree of cooperative effort.  
 Joint effort, which was categorized as a Type III cooperative effort, had the 
lowest number of ties--14 out-ties and seven in-ties (Table 5-3), which is consistent with 
the theory that each increasing level of cooperation will result in fewer cooperative 
efforts. The social network visualization was less dense than the other two levels of 
cooperation (Figure 5-3), which is consistent with the theory that ascending types of 
cooperation will result in fewer ties.  
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 The cooperation type of “refer patients” had a total of 16 out-ties and 15 in-ties 
(Table 5-4). While referring patients was not placed into its own cooperative category, it 
does indicate a level of cooperation among actors. When this network was visualized in 
UCINET (Figure 5-4), it did show that organizations had a fair level of cooperation in 
this category. 
 
Analysis 
 A clear pattern for degree centrality emerged in the social network analysis. As 
each cooperative level increased (from Type I to Type III), the number of cooperative 
efforts, or ties, decreased, which is consistent with Koch's (2011) theory that as 
cooperation requires more effort, cooperative relationships will decrease. A gradient was 
observed throughout the levels of cooperation, with decreasing number of ties as the 
cooperative level increased. This can be seen by the number of in-ties and out-ties; as the 
level of cooperation increased, both in-ties and out-ties decreased. Share information, 
which was categorized as a Type I cooperative effort, had the highest number of in-ties 
(42) and out-ties (41). Joint effort, which was categorized as a Type III cooperative 
effort, had the lowest number of ties--14 out-ties and seven in-ties. This is consistent with 
Koch's (2011) assertion that each level of increasing cooperation will result in fewer 
cooperative efforts, as it becomes considerably more difficult to cooperate effectively. 
Type I cooperation (which was actually labelled as “coordination”) exemplified “staying 
out of each others’ way.” Less communication is involved in a coordination effort than in 
a cooperation effort. While this data should not be interpreted with finality, due to sample 
size limitations, it does exhibit the expected pattern that Koch (2011) describes. 
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 In analyzing the data from Table 5-1 it is noticeable that most actors do not share 
information with many other organizations working in maternal and child health with the 
exception of Actors 4, 11 and 68.  As exemplified in the visualization of the "Sharing 
information" network (Figure 5-1), there are small clusters of networks, but they are 
separate and distinct from one another. This holds true for other visualizations (Figure 5-
2: Share resources/materials and Figure 5-3: Joint effort); there are small clusters of 
networks, but they are separate and distinct from one another, and the number of ties 
decrease as the level of cooperation increases. These visualizations also show that the 
number of actors in the networks decrease as the level of cooperation increases. 
 Actor 68 is worthy of some additional commentary. This actor formed a network 
of birthing centers; that is, the intent of the organization was to create its own network. 
which explains why this actor has the highest number of ties for information sharing, 
sharing resources/materials and joint effort. The nature of forming a network would 
indicate that effort would be put into having as many established, cooperative 
relationships as possible at various levels of cooperation. What is interesting to note is 
that, even though Actor 68 does exist to form a network, Koch's (2011) theories still hold 
true throughout each level of cooperation. Actor 68's ties decrease as the level of 
cooperation increases.  
 Based on the above degree centrality information for each level of cooperation, it 
can be said that there are no highly prestigious or prominent actors in the network, with 
the exception of Actor 68. Some actors exhibited a high number of ties relative to the 
others, but these actors were generally central within their own network; in other words, 
networks were generally separate and distinct. In the context of this exploratory social 
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network analysis, Actor 68 can be said to potentially have a fair amount of influence on 
its network, as it exhibits the highest number of out-ties for sharing information, sharing 
resources and joint effort. Given that Actor 68's network exists to improve birthing 
practices in Haiti, this actor has an opportunity to influence all other actors.  
 
Closeness centrality: Reach 
 Degree centrality is useful for understanding how many ties an actor might have 
to others, but this measure only takes into account the immediate ties each actor has, 
rather than the number of indirect ties. Closeness centrality is a useful measure because it 
focuses on how far each actor is from another. Reach tells users what portion of actors 
that ego--the central actor in the network--can reach in various steps, with steps 
representing distance (one step, two steps, three steps, etc) (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
Shorter paths are desirable in this study, because effective cooperation would in part 
depend on the speed with which information can be shared. A desirable score is closest to 
one; a score of one means that every actor in the network can reach ego in one step. The 
further the score from one, the further actors are from ego.  
 Reach is calculated by measuring the "reach distance" to or from each ego. The 
maximum score (which is equal to the number of nodes) is achieved when each actor is 
one step from ego (Hanneman & Riddle 2005).  
  Calculations for reach in UCINET were run. For all types of cooperation, scores 
were low; the highest scores for each level of cooperation are shown in tables 5-5, 5-6 
and 5-7.  
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 Table 5-5 shows inward and outward reach for "share information" for actors who 
had reach scores higher than .03. Any actors with reach scores below 0.03 were excluded 
from the table. The reason for this was because actors with reach scores below 0.03 were 
generally the social isolates who were not interviewed for this particular study. The mean 
reach score for "Share information" for both inward reach and outward reach was 0.01, 
and the range was 0.105 to 0.01, indicating that most actors cannot reach ego. A few 
actors had scores that were higher than 0.03, but most actors had reach scores of 0.01; 
this substantially brought down the mean. In this case, the mean is misleading in the 
sense that there were some actors that had scores that were a fair degree higher than 0.01, 
but these actors were very few. This would indicate that there are a few actors in their 
own networks, but that the networks are dispersed and not connected. 
 Table 5-6 shows inward and outward reach scores for "share resources." Only 
those actors with scores of higher than 0.03 were included. The mean inward and outward 
reach score for "Share resources" was 0.01 for both measures, and the range was 0.095 to 
0.01. Again, this shows that the actors cannot reach "ego" very easily, and as is the case 
for the "share information" measure, most actors cannot reach ego, as the networks are 
dispersed.  
 Table 5-7 displays reach scores for "joint effort." Only those actors with inward 
and/or outward reach scores of 0.03 were included in the table. The mean for this 
measure was 0.01 and the range was 0.076 to 0.01. As in the previous two reach 
measures (share information and share resources), actors cannot reach ego very easily 
and the networks are quite dispersed.  
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 As is exhibited in the data, the social networks in this research are not very close 
in terms of "reach distance." In other words, actors cannot reach ego easily, and in fact, 
many could not reach ego at all. In this particular study, the data indicated that networks 
were dispersed; reach scores confirmed this. It should be stated that these measures 
should be interpreted as exploratory only, given sample size limitations. 
 
Cohesion: Density 
 Density is a measure that shows the connectedness of a network--is the network 
tightly cohesive or loosely connected? The density of a network can give insight into how 
quickly information diffuses among actors, as well as the extent to which actors have 
high levels of social capital. The density of a network is the proportion of all possible ties 
that currently exist (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
 As is seen in Table 5-8, it is clear that the network in this study is very loosely 
connected, as density is considerably low. A score that is closer to one indicates a highly 
dense network; a score closer to zero indicates a "loose" network. Dense networks are 
those that have high connectivity, and actors in a dense network would, for purposes of 
this study, exhibit a high level of cooperation. A loose network in this particular study 
would indicate that actors are not exhibiting a high level of cooperation; this study 
showed that the networks that exist are rather loose, and therefore not exhibiting high 
levels of cooperation.  
 After interviews were conducted and the social network analysis was constructed, 
I investigated each participant organization’s website for mention of collaboration, 
cooperation or partnerships in the organization's vision, mission and/or goals. In addition, 
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if available, annual reports were analyzed to investigate whether or not there was 
discussion of collaborative efforts with NGO partners. Then, these findings were 
compared to the results of the semi-structured interview, in particular, the answer to the 
question, "How do you work to achieve your goals?" 
 I conducted background research on each organization after the semi-structured 
interviews occurred. I decided not to use background information on each organization 
for interview probing, because I theorized that if cooperation was truly embedded in the 
organization's purpose, mission and values, then it would be fairly simple for participants 
to produce a list of partners. While gathering a list of organizations that each participant 
listed on its website ahead of the interviews, and then using this list as a probe, may have 
gathered more complete information, I was interested in how organically partnership and 
collaboration was embedded in each participant organization’s work. Further research 
could take this approach to gather more complete and extensive network information. 
 Eleven of the 17 participants mentioned partnerships or collaborative efforts in 
their mission, vision or values statements on their websites. One example is an 
organization that directly linked its "values" to its stated approach to achieving its 
mission and goals. This organization stated that one of its values was to "...strive to be in 
genuine partnership with those who share our vision." The organization also stated in its 
approach:  
 "We work in collaboration with Haiti's Ministry of Public Health and Population 
 and other organizations to deliver culturally appropriate, high impact health 
 interventions."  
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 Of the 11 organizations that had information concerning collaboration on their 
websites, six of them specifically listed their partners on their websites. This was 
generally shown by having a separate area of the website where a list of partners was 
visible. One of these participants not only had a list of partners, but also included reasons 
why partnership with them was beneficial. These benefits included "minimum investment 
for large impact," "goal of sustainable social enterprises" and "established network." 
 If available, annual reports were also investigated. Five of the 11 organizations 
that had information concerning collaboration on their websites also had annual reports 
posted. Of these five organizations, only one participant organization included mention of 
a partnership with another organization. The value of partnerships with other NGO 
collaborators was stated in the annual report:  
 "[We] partner with other organizations to promote sustainable livelihood 
 programs that improve economic health and in turn physical health in [our] 
 communities." 
 
This partnership was collaboration on an animal husbandry project, which is not directly 
related to maternal and child health, but indirectly supports maternal and child health by 
providing food and income (distal determinants of health).  
 When comparing the findings from the website analyses with the interviews, I 
found that although multiple organizations stated and recognized the value of 
partnerships and collaboration on their websites, very few stated that partnerships and 
collaboration were essential for achieving their mission and goals in relation to maternal 
and child health.  
 Only one participant directly stated that working with a partner organization was 
essential to achieving organizational goals. The organizational goal was to establish a 
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network of maternal health services. The way in which the participant stated that the 
organization worked to achieve that goal was: 
 "We have been...active in trying to help provide information and the necessary 
 tools that [the community] needs. We sent two of our community health workers 
 to the mainland to be trained by [one of our partners]. So our activity has mainly 
 been in supporting [the community's] request for better maternal services." 
 
Further, this particular participant's organizational website listed partners and had a 
"Manual of Best Practice and Guiding Principles," where one of the guiding principles 
listed was "Partnerships, collaboration and networking." This Guiding Principle listed  
prerequisites to partnership, some of which included: 
 1. The partnership will collaborate with other entities only if the relationship is 
 transparent and consistent with the stated mission of the partnership. 
  
 2. The partnership will collaborate on the basis of shared values, common ground 
 and for the good of society. 
  
 3. The partnership will collaborate only on the basis of equitable and genuine 
 mutual benefit to each organization and with full transparency and a two way 
 flow of information. (Note: This website is not cited in the document to protect the 
 identity of the participant). 
 
 The participant discussed in the preceding paragraphs was the only participant 
whose website information aligned with the qualitative data in regards to working in 
collaboration to achieve goals.  
 One other participant mentioned that her organization worked with the Haitian 
Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), but did not mention working with 
other NGOs. Another participant mentioned working with a community group to achieve 
organizational goals, but did not mention working with other NGOs. Yet a third 
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participant discussed working with grassroots organizations and local community groups, 
but did not list NGOs as being a part of this collaborative effort to achieve goals. 
 It is clear from this data that the value of partnerships and collaboration are 
recognized among participant organizations, and that it is listed on official documentation 
as an important part of achieving organizational goals. However, there is some 
discrepancy between what is listed on websites and official documentation and how 
participants describe the manner in which they work to achieve their goals. Throughout 
the majority of the rest of the interviews, however, participants did recognize the value of 
partnerships. 
 
Limitations 
 It is critical to address the limitation of this social network analysis. As mentioned 
previously, this social network analysis was exploratory only, so results should not be 
interpreted in the same way as a full social network analysis. It was difficult to recruit 
study participants, the number of actors that were able to be properly interviewed was 
low. Often, reciprocal ties could not be assessed, due to the low number of participants.  
The language in which the interviews were conducted was English, and this 
limited potential participants. There are a number of NGOs working in Haiti from 
countries other than the United States, and conducting interviews in Spanish, French or 
Creole would most likely have expanded the potential participant sample. 
 My recruitment strategy resulted in a total of 17 participants, which generated a 
free-list total of 106 organizations. Only 16% of this network that was established was 
able to be interviewed, and therefore, social network calculations should not be 
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interpreted with finality, as the low number of total participants limits any inferences that 
can be made. 
 I asked participants to free-list organizations with which they work. Had I 
examined organizational websites beforehand and used the information gained in this 
endeavor, or had I probed participants with a listing of other organizations that had 
previously been listed, I may have been able to construct a more robust organizational 
list.  
 When looking at mean scores, it should be considered that averages can be 
difficult to interpret. This is particularly the case with the density measure. As the values 
are small, it can be misleading, because as group size increases, density decreases as 
actor degrees remain unchanged (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Given that the majority of 
actors that were produced in this network were not interviewed, relationships could not 
accurately be assessed. 
 These limitations should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results 
of the social network analysis. Further research into the actors listed in this network is 
needed in order to draw an accurate conclusion on social network measures, particularly 
density. In order to successfully complete a whole network analysis on this population, a 
higher number of participants would need to be recruited so that proper inferences can be 
drawn. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2-1 
Participant Organization Descriptions 
 
Actor Mission MCH 
Services 
Provided 
Length of 
operation 
Local or 
non-local 
Revenue 
(2015) 
1 To provide 
excellent 
physical, 
spiritual, 
emotional, 
educational 
and economic 
care for at-risk 
children and 
families in 
Haiti. 
Nutrition, 
prenatal, 
foster care 
29 years Non-local $1.25 
million 
3 A mutual 
relationship of 
supporting 
education for 
children and 
adults, 
improving 
access to 
healthcare and 
nutrition, 
assisting with 
economic 
development. 
Testing and 
monitoring, 
prenatal 
vitamins, 
vaccinations, 
birth control, 
follow-up 
care post-
partum, 
children’s 
nutrition 
30 years Non-local $405,000 
4 To provide 
essential 
health 
services to the 
people of 
Southern 
Haiti, 
especially the 
most 
vulnerable. 
Maternal & 
Neonatal 
Health 
Center 
(pediatric 
care, NICU, 
skilled birth 
attendance) 
28 years Non-local $6.9 million 
6 To provide 
primary care 
Maternity 
care 
6 years Non-local n/a* 
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to vulnerable 
population in 
Artibonite 
region 
(birthing 
home) 
7 To serve the 
poorest of the 
poor in the 
developing 
world. 
Primary 
care, 
prenatal 
care, 
ultrasounds 
28 years Non-local $560,000 
10 To support 
Haitian 
communities 
in their efforts 
to build and 
sustain 
healthy 
families by 
developing 
best health 
care practices 
to share across 
Haiti and 
other low-
resource 
communities. 
Cervical 
cancer 
prevention 
and 
treatment, 
safe 
motherhood 
programs 
17 years Non-local $850,000 
11 To minister to 
the people of 
Haiti with the 
love of Christ 
Prenatal 
care, 
nutrition, 
malnutrition 
inpatient 
clinic for 
children 
11 years Non-local $605,000 
15 To strengthen 
families by 
serving the 
health and 
nutritional 
needs of 
children while 
reaching 
families with 
the gospel of 
Jesus Christ. 
Outpatient 
malnutrition 
for children 
3 years Non-local $510,000 
35 To improve 
life in 
Water 
purification 
11 years Non-local $225,000 
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developing 
countries by 
identifying 
and 
encouraging 
the use of 
affordable 
water 
purification 
systems, 
teaching the 
importance of 
proper 
household 
water 
treatment and 
creating new 
business 
opportunities 
for local 
people. 
and 
treatment 
38 To bring 
transformation 
to Haiti 
through the 
message of 
Jesus Christ. 
Health clinic 
(primary 
care) 
n/a n/a n/a 
41 To collaborate 
with the 
people of the 
Artibonite 
Valley as they 
strive to 
improve their 
health and 
quality of life. 
Full service 
hospital 
60 years Non-local $8.7 million 
45 To support 
healthcare, 
community 
and education. 
Prenatal and 
childcare 
(primary 
care) 
10 years Non-local $155,000 
61 To achieve a 
better quality 
of life for the 
people in 
Gran Bois, 
Primary care 
clinic 
11 years Non-local $383,000 
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Haiti. 
68 To share and 
promote good 
birth practices 
and birth 
home models 
in low-
resource 
communities 
Intrapartum, 
prenatal and 
postnatal 
care 
One year Non-local n/a 
95 To raise a 
healthy 
generation of 
children in 
Haiti, who can 
in turn raise 
Haiti from 
poverty, 
through 
training 
programs, 
community 
development 
and direct 
nutrition and 
health care 
Acute 
malnutrition 
community 
management, 
inpatient 
treatment of 
severe acute 
malnutrition, 
maternal 
health 
13 years Non-local $640,000 
97 To increase 
access to 
skilled 
maternity care 
in Haiti. 
Training 
skilled birth 
attendants 
and 
traditional 
birth 
attendants 
7 years Non-local $770,000 
105 To maintain a 
clinic and 
health care 
initiatives in 
Haiti. 
Primary care 18 years Non-local $1.1 million 
 
 
*Organization is non-U.S., and does not adhere to same reporting requirements. 
Information not available 
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Table 5-1. Social Network Analysis: Degree Centrality Scores for Actors who   
       Share Information 
 
Actor Out Degree In Degree 
1 1 0 
2 0 1 
3 0 1 
4 7 1 
7 0 1 
8 0 2 
9 0 3 
10 0 2 
11 3 2 
14 0 1 
15 0 1 
20 2 0 
21 0 1 
23 0 1 
24 1 0 
25 0 1 
35 2 0 
38 1 0 
41 0 1 
42 0 1 
43 0 1 
45 2 1 
47 0 1 
53 2 1 
57 0 2 
61 3 0 
62 0 1 
64 0 1 
65 0 1 
66 0 1 
67 0 1 
68 10 0 
80 0 1 
95 8 0 
96 0 1 
97 0 1 
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Table 5-
2. Social Network Analysis: Degree Centrality Scores for Actors who  
       Share Resources 
	
98 0 1 
99 0 1 
100 0 1 
101 0 1 
102 0 1 
103 0 1 
105 0 1 
Actor Out Degree In Degree 
1 1 0 
3 0 1 
4 7 1 
7 0 2 
8 0 2 
9 0 2 
11 2 1 
14 0 1 
15 0 1 
20 1 0 
21 0 1 
24 1 0 
25 0 1 
34 1 0 
35 1 1 
41 0 1 
42 0 1 
43 0 1 
45 1 1 
47 0 1 
53 2 1 
57 0 2 
61 4 0 
62 0 1 
63 0 1 
64 0 1 
65 0 1 
66 0 1 
67 0 1 
68 9 0 
69 0 1 
89 0 1 
95 2 0 
96 0 1 
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Table 5-3. Social Network Analysis: Degree Centrality Scores for Actors who  
       Participate in a Joint Effort 
 
105 0 1 
Actor Out Degree In Degree 
11 2 1 
20 2 0 
21 0 1 
23 0 1 
35 1 0 
38 0 1 
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Table 5-4. Social Network Analysis: Degree Centrality Scores for Actors who  
       Refer Patients to Other Actors 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-5. Social Network Analysis: Closeness Centrality (Reach) Scores for  
      Actors who Share Information 
 
Actor Outward Reach Inward Reach 
47 0 1 
53 2 0 
57 0 1 
68 7 0 
80 0 1 
Actor Out Degree In Degree 
1 5 0 
3 0 2 
4 4 1 
6 0 1 
7 0 1 
10 0 2 
11 1 0 
15 0 2 
35 1 0 
38 0 1 
41 0 1 
45 1 2 
61 1 0 
95 3 0 
97 0 1 
105 0 1 
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68 0.105 0.010 
95 0.086 0.010 
4 0.076 0.019 
45 0.052 0.019 
11 0.043 0.029 
53 0.038 0.024 
	
 
Table 5-6. Social Network Analysis: Closeness Centrality (Reach) Scores for  
      Actors who Share Resources 
 
Actor Outward Reach Inward Reach 
68 0.095 0.010 
4 0.076 0.019 
45 0.048 0.019 
61 0.048 0.010 
11 0.033 0.019 
53 0.033 0.019 
 
	
Table 5-7. Social Network Analysis: Closeness Centrality (Reach) Scores for  
      Actors who Participate in a Joint Effort 
 
 
Actor Outward Reach Inward Reach 
68 0.076 0.010 
53 0.038 0.010 
	
	
Table 5-8. Social Network Analysis: Density Scores for Actors who Share  
 Information, Share Resources and Participate in a Joint Effort 
 
Cooperation Level Density 
Share Information 0.004 
Share Resources 0.003 
Joint Effort 0.001 
	
 
 
 
Figure 5-1. Social Network Visualization for Actors who Share Information 
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Figure 5-2 
Social Network Visualization for Actors who Share Resources 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3. Social Network Visualization for Actors who Participate in a Joint Effort 
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Figure 5-4. Social Network Visualization: Degree centrality for Actors who Refer 
Patients  
 
 
 
	
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
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CONCLUSION 
 
	 The main goal of this research was to gain a deeper understanding of the level of 
collective action that was occurring among NGOs working in maternal and child health 
in Haiti. As there is currently little research on collective action among NGOs, and in 
particular, little to no research on collective action among NGOs in Haiti, Haiti 
constituted a perfect site in which to study this phenomenon.  
 The literature on collective action finds that collective action is difficult, in 
practice, to achieve. Further, the literature also finds that in the provision of public goods, 
collective action is the most effective and most efficient way to deliver public goods to 
the population. Using health as a public good, it therefore follows that collective action in 
the provision of health services is the most optimal way to deliver said services to the 
population.  
 This research found that, consistent with the literature, collective action in Haiti is 
low. With the exception of one particular actor (Actor 68), collective action in Haiti is 
limited.  
 The results from the social network analysis, which, overall, displayed low 
cohesion and exhibited loose networks, support the qualitative data. As was evidenced in 
the social network data, few networks exist among NGO actors. While there are a fair 
number of relationships that exist, they are often at the lowest level, and true to Koch's 
(2011) theory, the number of relationships decrease as the level of cooperation increases.  
 It is fair to say that while cooperation is occurring among NGOs working in 
maternal and child health in Haiti, it falls far short of true collective action. There are 
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relationships that share information, but fewer relationships that share resources and 
materials, and even fewer relationships that participate in a joint effort.  
 While Actor 68 follows this same gradient, it is an outlier in comparison to the 
other research participants. Actor 68 exists to form a network of birthing centers. The 
network's sole intent is to improve maternal health outcomes in Haiti; it envisions doing 
this by bringing together organizations working in the maternal health space so that 
information and best practices can be shared, and common goals achieved. Actor 68 
exhibits, at its core, true collective action. 
 Though this research yielded important information on collective action in Haiti, 
it should be noted that, as mentioned in previous chapters, there are some significant 
limitations. First, it should be noted that the snowball sampling method yielded only 17 
participants. Given that it has been estimated that Haiti has over 10,000 NGOs (though 
the number specifically working in maternal and child health is unknown), there is 
substantial room for improvement in sample size in future research. Though data 
saturation did occur in the qualitative portion of the research, a more robust sample size 
might yield additional insight. Second, a full understanding of the cooperative networks 
that are occurring in Haiti could not be completely assessed, as a map of networks could 
only be created on the basis of these 17 participants. Again, given the sheer number of 
NGOs that exist in Haiti, it is indeed conceivable that additional, and perhaps denser, 
networks exist. Finally, collective action among NGOs that are working in maternal and 
child health was the only type of collective action assessed. In other words, there was 
cooperation occurring among organizations that worked in different, and often 
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complementary, fields. This type of cooperation cannot be discounted, as it can and does 
yield important population level health benefits.  
 Substantial literature has been written on global health partnerships, but the 
majority of the literature has addressed public-private partnerships. The role of such 
partnerships in the global health space cannot be discounted; indeed, public-private 
partnerships are vital for advancing global health interests. Less attention has been given 
to studying local non-profit partnerships; that is, partnerships between organizations 
working in-country to advance a health agenda.  
 The importance of partnerships was a focal point for the Millennium 
Development Goals--Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development (United 
Nations, n.d.). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) continues this vision with 
Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the partnership for 
sustainable development (United Nations, 2016). There is the recognition in the SDGs 
that one of the pillars of their success hinges on a renewed sense of partnership (Barnes, 
Brown & Harmon, 2016). Achieving effective partnerships is critical to advancing the 
global health agenda and improving outcomes, including in maternal and child health.  
 While people generally agree on the importance of partnerships, and there are 
certainly many partnerships that currently exist, less is known about what this partnership 
actually means for the stakeholders who are responsible for operationalizing it and 
putting it into practice (Barnes, Brown & Harman, 2016). Further, while collaborative 
quality improvement initiatives are prevalent in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and other developed nations, few have been reported in low-and middle-income 
countries. Broad partnership recommendations abound--the Paris Declaration of 2005 
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emphasizes harmonization--donor countries should coordinate, simplify procedures and 
share information to avoid duplication. The Accra Agenda for Action advances inclusive 
partnerships (OECD, n.d.). The World Health Organization considers itself a lead 
convener (Lorenz, 2007). Yet the difficult question remains: how should partnerships 
actually be implemented? What do they look like?  
 To answer these questions, it is important to first consider the context. While 
broad partnership recommendations can be made (and often are), a "one size fits all" 
approach is inappropriate. It is necessary to first understand the socio-cultural and 
political dynamics within a specific health system context (Barnes, Brown & Harman, 
2016). Therefore, seeking out information from local actors, as this research did, will 
help the researcher to contextualize the situations in which partnerships occur and form, 
as well as understand the complex dynamics that are at play that might hinder effective 
cooperation.   
 Ramaswamy et al. (2016) summarize the components of a successful partnership 
in global health: 
 1) Recognize and accept the need for partnership 
 2) Develop clarity and realism of purpose 
 3) Ensure commitment and ownership 
 4) Develop and maintain trust 
 5) Create robust and clear partnership working arrangements 
 6) Monitor, measure and learn  
 
 The participants in this research clearly recognize and accept the need for 
partnership (component #1), but the presence of some of the other components are 
murkier. There is little clarity that exists around which partnership visions can be formed 
(component #2); further, while there may be a sense of commitment to a partnership, 
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ownership issues (component #3) may be difficult to disentangle, as there is an intense 
feeling of competition and egos in the Haiti NGO community.  This would need to be 
lessened, if not eliminated, if the fourth component--develop and maintain trust--were to 
be achieved.  
 As stated previously, one cannot take sweeping generalizations and apply them in 
a "one size fits all" attempt. However, researchers can analyze what has worked in 
various settings and modify those results for specific contexts. For example, Ramaswamy 
et al. (2016) conducted a multiple case study on Kybele, a 501(c)(3) that is "dedicated to 
improving childbirth safety through innovative partnerships in low resource settings" 
(p.2). The findings concluded that Kybele had four partnership principles that were 
paramount to ensuring partnership success: 
 1) Select an engaged champion 
 2) Obtain stakeholder support 
 3) Ensure partner involvement 
 4) Learn from the data 
 
 Any unsuccessful partnership in which Kybele engaged was missing at least one 
of the aforementioned principles. The Kybele model could be adapted and used in Haiti 
to engage stakeholders working in maternal and child health. Actor 68 would be a natural 
engaged champion; Actor 68 already has broad based support from a number of current 
partners, and actively seeks out additional support from potential partners. Given that 
Actor 68 already liaises with multiple partners, it can be inferred that it has an overall 
broad base of support from those partners.  
 It is recommended that Actor 68 be further studied, as it represents a promising 
approach to using partnership to improve maternal and child health outcomes in Haiti. 
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Further information is needed: what is Actor 68's approach to partnership? What 
principles underlie its vision and goals?  
 Actor 68 has plans to expand into other countries. Following its expansion, 
studying barriers, as well as modifications to local contexts, will be beneficial for 
contributing to the advancement of knowledge on successful partnership formation, 
implementation and most importantly, sustainability. Further, a more complete mapping 
of the social networks in Haiti will provide additional insight into the networks that exist 
and how these networks are working together. Not only will these future research 
directions contribute to the literature, but they will advance the field of global health on a 
practical level, as they have important implications for understanding best practices in 
collective action efforts. 
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1) What aspects of maternal and child health services do you provide? About what 
percentage of services are dedicated to maternal and child health services? 
 
2) What is your goal/mission in relation to maternal/child health? 
• How do you work to achieve these goals?  
 
3) What other NGOs exist in your geographical region that you are aware of? 
• What area do they work in? Education, health, general development? 
• Are you aware of any other organizations in your geographical region that 
also provide maternal child health services? 
 
4) In your estimation, how many NGOs do you think are currently working in maternal 
and child health in Haiti? 
 
5) Please name all other NGOs working in maternal and child health in Haiti that you 
can think of. Please include all organizations that you know of, and not just ones with 
which you might work or have a personal relationship. 
• Participant will list all organizations 
 
6) Now, of the organizations that you just listed, with which ones do you work? 
(Participant will name all organizations with which s/he works) 
• Please tell me about NGOx. What is your level of cooperation? Please 
select the type of collaboration that you have with NGOx: 
Organization Information Resources/Materials Joint efforts 
(meetings, 
workshops, 
fundraising) 
Other* 
*If participant chooses “Other”: What type of collaboration do you have? 
• Please tell me about your experience with NGOx. How long have you 
been working with this organization? 
• How often do you have contact with NGOx? 
• Do you feel that your relationship with NGOx has been beneficial? Why 
or why not? 
• If you do not currently work with any other entities, why not? 
 
7)   Have you ever been contacted by another NGO for the purposes of 
collaboration/cooperation? 
• What was your response?  
• What type of collaboration/cooperation was requested? 
• What was the outcome? 
• If favorable, tell me about this. If non-favorable, tell me about this. 
 
8)  Have any opportunities arisen for cooperation/collaboration? 
• Probe: such as a forum, inter-agency meetings, etc? 
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• What was your response? 
• What was the outcome? Favorable? Non-favorable? Why? 
 
9) Have you experienced cooperation/collaboration in an emergency (i.e., World Health 
Organization clusters during the aftermath of the earthquake)? 
• If yes, what was the extent of that cooperation/collaboration? 
• What was the experience like? 
• What was beneficial about that cooperation? 
• What needed to be improved? 
 
10) If participant does NOT currently work with any other organizations: How do you 
feel about the prospect of cooperating/collaborating with other agencies? 
 
11) Are there any instances in which you have thought that cooperation/collaboration 
might be beneficial, but did not actually cooperate? What instances are those? (list each 
separately and ask the follow-up questions separately for each instance): 
• Why would cooperation have been beneficial in this instance? 
• What hindered you from cooperating? 
• What conditions would need to have been in place in order for cooperation 
to occur in this instance? 
 
 
 12) Are there any instances where cooperation has been the intention, but it failed? 
• Tell me about this 
• Why did it fail? 
• What conditions might have made cooperation successful? 
 
13) What are the benefits of cooperation/collaboration? 
 
 
14) What barriers do you feel exist that hinder cooperation/collaboration? 
 
15) What conditions would need to exist in order for you to voluntarily 
cooperate/collaborate (informally) with other NGOs? (if person does not currently 
collaborate) 
 
16) Why do you think cooperation/collaboration does not occur more often between 
NGOs in Haiti? 
 
17) Do you think cooperation/collaboration should be required by the Haitian 
government?   
• Why or why not? 
 
18) Do you think cooperation/collaboration should be required by donor agencies? 
• Why or why not? 
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19) What would be the benefits to forced cooperation/collaboration? 
 
20) What would be the barriers to forced cooperation/collaboration? 
 
21) Do you think there should be a formal registration or information sharing 
forum/arena for NGOs working in Haiti? 
• Why or why not? 
• If yes, what would this look like? 
 
22) Do you feel that there is an environment of competition between NGOs in Haiti? 
• If yes, could you tell me more about it? 
• In what aspects do you feel you compete? Services, funding, overall 
results/achievements? 
 
23) Some of the previous research on cooperation and collaboration in the provision of 
public goods, such as health, has found that failure to cooperate can result in the 
following: fragmentation, incomplete information, resource misallocation and 
inefficiencies, and duplication of services. Have you experienced any of these situations: 
• Fragmentation? If yes, tell me more about it.  
• Incomplete information? If yes, tell me more about it. 
• Resource misallocation/inefficiencies? If yes, tell me more about it. 
• Duplication of services? If yes, tell me more about it. 
• If you have experienced any of the above, to what degree do you believe 
failure to cooperate caused any of these situations? 
• If have experienced any of the above, and you do not believe that failure 
to cooperate was responsible for any of the situations, what was 
responsible? 
 
24) Is there any other information that you would like to add to assist me in better 
 understanding any of the things we have discussed? 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
